FURNESS, Ms Gail SC, Inspector of the National Anti-Corruption Commission Committee met at 0 9 : 30 CHAIR ( Ms Thwaites ): I declare open this public hearing of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Anti-Corruption Commission for its inquiry into aspects of the NACC's performance of its functions. I begin by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land on which we meet and pay my respects to their elders, past and present. I extend that respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples here today. These are public proceedings being videostreamed live via the parliament's website, and a Hansard transcript is being made. I remind all witnesses that, in giving evidence to the committee, they are protected by parliamentary privilege. It is unlawful for anyone to threaten or disadvantage a witness on account of evidence given to a committee, and such action may be treated by the parliament as a contempt. It's also a contempt to give false or misleading evidence. The committee generally prefers evidence to be given in public, but witnesses do have the right to request to be heard in a private session. If a witness objects to answering a question, they should state the ground upon which the objection is made, and the committee will determine whether it will insist on an answer having regard to the ground which is claimed. If the committee determines to insist on an answer, a witness may request that the answer be given in camera. The committee set 8 September 2026 as the date for responses to any questions that are taken on notice. I remind members of their obligations under the Behaviour Code for Australian Parliamentarians to treat witnesses with dignity, courtesy, fairness and respect. I now welcome the Inspector of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. I remind the witness of the Senate order specifying the process by which a claim of public interest immunity should be raised. A copy of the order is available from the secretariat. The extract read as follows— Public interest immunity claims That the Senate— (a) notes that ministers and officers have continued to refuse to provide information to Senate committees without properly raising claims of public interest immunity as required by past resolutions of the Senate; (b) reaffirms the principles of past resolutions of the Senate by this order, to provide ministers and officers with guidance as to the proper process for raising public interest immunity claims and to consolidate those past resolutions of the Senate; (c) orders that the following operate as an order of continuing effect: (1) If: (a) a Senate committee, or a senator in the course of proceedings of a committee, requests information or a document from a Commonwealth department or agency; and (b) an officer of the department or agency to whom the request is directed believes that it may not be in the public interest to disclose the information or document to the committee, the officer shall state to the committee the ground on which the officer believes that it may not be in the public interest to disclose the information or document to the committee, and specify the harm to the public interest that could result from the disclosure of the information or document. (2) If, after receiving the officer's statement under paragraph (1), the committee or the senator requests the officer to refer the question of the disclosure of the information or document to a responsible minister, the officer shall refer that question to the minister. (3) If a minister, on a reference by an officer under paragraph (2), concludes that it would not be in the public interest to disclose the information or document to the committee, the minister shall provide to the committee a statement of the ground for that conclusion, specifying the harm to the public interest that could result from the disclosure of the information or document. (4) A minister, in a statement under paragraph (3), shall indicate whether the harm to the public interest that could result from the disclosure of the information or document to the committee could result only from the publication of the information or document by the committee, or could result, equally or in part, from the disclosure of the information or document to the committee as in camera evidence. (5) If, after considering a statement by a minister provided under paragraph (3), the committee concludes that the statement does not sufficiently justify the withholding of the information or document from the committee, the committee shall report the matter to the Senate. (6) A decision by a committee not to report a matter to the Senate under paragraph (5) does not prevent a senator from raising the matter in the Senate in accordance with other procedures of the Senate. (7) A statement that information or a document is not published, or is confidential, or consists of advice to, or internal deliberations of, government, in the absence of specification of the harm to the public interest that could result from the disclosure of the information or document, is not a statement that meets the requirements of paragraph (1) or (4). (8) If a minister concludes that a statement under paragraph (3) should more appropriately be made by the head of an agency, by reason of the independence of that agency from ministerial direction or control, the minister shall inform the committee of that conclusion and the reason for that conclusion, and shall refer the matter to the head of the agency, who shall then be required to provide a statement in accordance with paragraph (3). (d) requires the Procedure Committee to review the operation of this order and report to the Senate by 20 August 2009. (13 May 2009 J.1941) (Extract, Senate Standing Orders) CHAIR: I understand that information on parliamentary privilege and the protection of witnesses giving evidence to parliamentary committees has been provided to you. Will you please state your full name. Ms Furness : My full name is Gail Barton Furness. CHAIR: Did you want to make an opening statement? Ms Furness : Just a short one, if I may. Thank you, firstly, for granting me an extension to provide the submission. I'm very grateful for that. The data in my submission solely relates to complaints about timeliness and complaints where I was satisfied that I had sufficient information to properly indicate a response to you. However, in many of the complaints that I do receive, regardless of the nature of the complaint, there is evident considerable delay in responding to referrals. I note the performance information data that's contained in the commission's report, particularly in relation to tier 2 matters. It's useful, I think, for the committee to know that that is my experience and is consistent with my understanding that over 240 days is the medium or average time in respect to tier 2, and for preliminary investigations it's over 480 days. That certainly is consistent with the material I have. CHAIR: I appreciate that. Yes, your submission very much goes to timeliness, which is one of the key things that we are examining as part of this inquiry. Part of what we're looking at there is the impact that that's having on complainants to the NACC. Could you speak more about what people are bringing to you when they do bring these concerns around timeliness and the impact it's having on them? Ms Furness : Certainly. In my submission I set out some of the concerns that people have expressed to me, and indeed, disappointment is, not surprisingly, one of them. They consider that it's a waste of everyone's time to be waiting for a response, and the world's moved on. Their concerns may have the effects or consequences, or their concerns may well have changed. They form the view that the NACC's not particularly interested in what they have to say, and if they were more interested, there would be a more prompt response. One described it as emotionally draining and that it had catastrophic impacts on health and wellbeing, and mental distress. They see it as a lack of accountability. They're the sorts of comments I've referred to in my submission which come directly from complaints to me. CHAIR: Part of the stage that the NACC is in is that it's still a new but not completely new institution, and part of our architecture is building this sense that people have about how it's doing its work and how it interacts with people who want it to do its work. Do you think this has an impact on how those people feel about the NACC as an institution? Ms Furness : Certainly, that's the impression I have from complaints I receive. They view it in terms of a lack of accountability, in that they're not responding in a way that people think is reasonable in terms of timeliness. From complaints, I think they also wonder about what is actually happening if, indeed, their referrals are being left, seemingly to them, in a bottom drawer; what else is happening? There's no question from the material I have that it impacts on the public trust. CHAIR: In your role you've raised the issues that come to you with the NACC. What does the NACC come back to you with when you raise these issues? What's their explanation for what's happening at their end? Ms Furness : I've also set out in our submission the various responses that the NACC has given to individuals, and there is a consistency of themes. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, the themes haven't particularly changed that much over the three years, whereas you might expect that there had been improvement in some areas and they would have dropped off as reasons. It was a frequent comment early on that they had the burden of the ACLEI matters that were handed over in transition; one would have thought they would have significantly lessened over the three years. There have been IT concerns; again, one might have hoped that some of those had been resolved. Retention of staff continues to be a problem. Another issue that they raise is volume—I'm not quite sure about that, because it seems to have lessened over time and it seems to be less than other, more established commissioned. The reasons haven't really changed very much, but I'm certainly hopeful that the initiatives that they refer to in their submission in respect of timeliness would go a long way if successfully implemented. CHAIR: When I was looking through the examples you put in your submission, I noted that staffing seemed to be a regular theme which we've explored with the commission before and noted that they certainly have adequate budget for staffing, and that's what they've said to us. I am concerned that it does seem like there is still an issue if staff aren't able to be in a position to respond in a timely way. Is that the sense that you're getting, that a turnover of staff means they can't provide that regular correspondence with people who are contacting the NACC? Ms Furness : The turnover of staff is one aspect. Another aspect which I raised very early on was, it seemed to me from my experience elsewhere, that the staff who were initially responsible for assessment were very junior in the scheme of things. There was no legal input at all in the early days, and recommended that there be legal input, particularly where jurisdiction was an issue. Another aspect is delegations. I'm not sure that the delegations were sufficient so that decisions could be made appropriately at a more junior level. I think some work has been and is proposed to be done on the question of delegation. They're issues that I have seen. I know they've made a lot of changes; I'm just not sure what effect they have had when you look at the data that they've provided in the submission about how long things take. CHAIR: I know you've obviously had the experience of doing a similar role with the New South Wales ICAC. Are there any lessons the federal NACC should be learning from how the New South Wales ICAC approaches this process of timeliness and incoming communication with referrers? Ms Furness : I noticed that the chief commissioner, when giving evidence to you, said that he had no issue as far as he was aware of turnover. I think he described the ICAC as the employer of destination, so they don't have a retention problem. I certainly know from their staff that they have had people who have worked in the assessment area for a very long time, so they have that continuity and that experience. They've certainly made changes, which I think the chief commissioner described to you, about how they handle it to change the process and increase it, but it is a longstanding institution that's well regarded, and I think what the chief commissioner said to you about what they do, how they do it and the effectiveness of it is your best source of information as to how a well-regarded agency operates. CHAIR: I'll ask one final question, and then I'll hand over to the deputy chair. You recommend in your submission that we consider directing or recommending the commission institute communication protocols for updating referrers who don't receive an outcome within that 90-day service period that the NACC has. Do you have a sense of what a better communication protocol would look like, in this case? Ms Furness : There are two aspects to that. The first is they say their tier 1s are generally responded to within 90 days, with the extraordinarily large caveat that that's those that have been completed, not 'not completed'. I think the larger problem is those they call the tier 2. Those are the ones that need a bit of attention. They take so long to respond to them. I understand the sensitivities and if there's an investigation on foot; however, it may well be that a timeframe is considered in which there is an update. It might not be the 90 days. It may be the next, the tier 2, because certainly well over a year is not helpful to anybody. I can't say what that number would be. Maybe it's arbitrary. Maybe it's somewhat random. I would have thought that, within six months, a referrer should be told what was happening. Again, I'm not suggesting that six months is the principle that's backed by science, but nevertheless a figure of that sort, I would have thought, would give comfort to the referrers and nevertheless permit the commission to comply with any secrecy or privacy obligations or protect its investigations. CHAIR: Yes, you're really going to a balance—aren't you?—between people feeling like there is something happening with information they've given to the NACC alongside the NACC being able to do its work. Ms Furness : That's right and much better put! Thank you. CHAIR: Thank you, Inspector. Deputy Chair. Dr HAINES: Thank you, Inspector, for your submission and for your appearance today. I want to pick up on some of your earlier commentary in regard to comparisons with the New South Wales ICAC. In June, the committee heard from the commissioner of ICAC. I'm sure I'm not the only one who found that that was very useful in helping to learn about New South Wales ICAC, how it operates and how the commission approaches some of the issues that this committee and this inquiry is considering. Given that you are in a unique position in that you're the inspector of both the ICAC and the NACC, I wondered if you could outline for us some of the similarities and differences in being an inspector in both jurisdictions. Ms Furness : The differences are that I perceive a sense of, if not urgency, responsiveness in the ICAC of getting back to people, whereas I don't perceive the same sense in the NACC. There seems to be a different internal culture concerning efficiency, which may be a bit of a pejorative word—speed, perhaps—within which certain actions involving the public should occur. That may well be a matter of culture, and that may well be a cultural matter that shifts over time. The ICAC has certainly changed its approach to delegated decision-making to be more efficient so that the commissioners and the chief commissioner share among themselves decision-making, as opposed to it being a collective decision making on each occasion. That's certainly freed up their time, which I think has the effect of more rapidly completing investigations. They have more time to do other things. The sense I have in the NACC is that, while relatively simple decisions were delegated, many more decisions were made by the commissioner, which of course took time for a whole range of reasons. The ICAC is moving to a more tiered approach, which the chief commissioner might have told you about. I'm not sure how that will work, but certainly the complaints I get from the ICAC—other than the similarity of, 'They didn't investigate my complaint'—largely arise from people being concerned at the assessment stage that they're not being heard. When I look into those complaints, with the greatest respect to complainants, they're not always the most reasonable people when they come to express their dissatisfaction. The communication issues that I have with the ICAC are of a much lesser nature than perhaps with the NACC. Dr HAINES: Are there particular things in the scope of one role that are different to the other role? Ms Furness : Let's talk about the past three years, which is probably the simplest. I certainly have had a lot more interaction with the ICAC than with the NACC, although in the last month I think I can say fairly that I've spoken more with the acting commissioner than I did with the former commissioner in the last three years. Communication has been very different, but I expect, going forward, communication with the statutory office holders will be more similar. With the ICAC, the chief commissioner and I speak regularly about issues that are coming up in relation to operations. Operation Rosny at the moment has caused a great deal of work for all of us, it must be said. Because of the public nature of what the ICAC does, there's a lot more happening for the public to engage with, which is obviously different from NACC. I have a far more collaborative engagement with the ICAC, which is excellent because it means that problems can be resolved before they happen. Dr HAINES: Do you find you spend different amounts of time on different issues between the two jurisdictions? Are they different things that people are complaining to you about? We're talking a lot about timeliness, but are there things that are particular that you've noticed around the NACC in comparison to the ICAC? Ms Furness : One aspect is the extent to which operations are conducted. Whenever the ICAC is conducting an operation which has left its covert stage, I can receive complaints about execution of search warrants and coercive powers, then the conduct of hearings and then perhaps procedural fairness issues in respect of submissions and outcomes. That is a reflection of the established nature of the commission. They do operations more. They do them in public. With NACC, nothing's in public, and their operational work is at a different stage. Whenever there's a public hearing, I'm busier on the ICAC side, but, in terms of complaints, most of them, other than the operational complaints, are reasonably straightforward. It's very hard to compare because, as you know, for the last two years a lot of my time has been taken up in respect of conflicts of interest in the Defence sphere. It's very difficult to compare because no-one expected that, and it took a lot of time. Going forward, I don't expect that to be the case. Dr HAINES: Can I go to timeliness and communication now, if I may. Your submission focused on timeliness of assessments. Have you identified any trends in complaints about timeliness, and are there particular types of referrals that are overrepresented? You gave us evidence just now around tier 1 and tier 2, and I think you were telling us that this hasn't changed much over time. I just want to confirm that that hasn't changed. Ms Furness : When I look at the data that the NACC has provided the commission, they're very large numbers—and that is three years on. There were large numbers fairly early on, and that was, we were told, because of ACLEI. To me, it feels random. I don't sense any pattern as to the nature of the referral that may or may not result in it taking longer—clearly, the out-of-jurisdiction ones and the ones that are individual disputes. That's what's always surprised me about the KPIs and how they reported them, although we all note the caveat now—that it just seemed random. I don't understand how a system can produce what appears, to me, to be somewhat random results. Dr HAINES: I'm curious about that, too. It's interesting for you to say this. There's no one theme coming through, there's no one area of complaint from a particular Commonwealth department area or—no? Ms Furness : If I can add one matter to that: the NACC has said in its submissions that where it gets continual emails from individuals, it makes the assessment process more difficult. I have experienced that; you can get 20 emails overnight, and, if they contain potentially new information, they all have to be considered. That is one area which makes it longer. It may also be the case that, notwithstanding that I have referred a matter, you all might have separately referred it with slightly different information. The more referrals about one issue—I accept that that can extend. Dr HAINES: You've spoken to some of the explanations given by the NACC about why the referrals are taking so long, and some of them are things like IT—three years on, it's surprising that that's still problematic. Retention of staff is another one. Do you think there are some referrals that are genuinely complex? I appreciated the case studies you gave in your submission, where you talked about things like people continually emailing and some of the problems that creates, but, to the best of your knowledge, is there a correlation between timeliness and an extremely complex referral? Ms Furness : It's difficult for me to assess because, quite often, in the complaints—I know from the point of view of the referral what they consider to be complexity, but that's generally subjective. It's hard for me to tell, but I don't doubt they receive complex referrals and I don't doubt that the more complex they are, and the more data generated, means they take longer. From the ICAC, we all know the complexity of the material they deal with; it's been open to all of us to see over the last three weeks. Prior to that, they had three public hearings this year which were clearly complex, involving many different people and following various money trails. It falls to reason that the NACC must be receiving complex investigations. I have some visibility because they provide me with summonses and reasons for issuing summonses—but there's not much more I should say about their operations. Dr HAINES: I think it's interesting that, in your comparison with the ICAC and the public hearings component, you said that at that point it generates different kinds of complaints to you. Overall, would you say that having the public hearing component of the ICAC opens the door somewhat to people then understanding the complexity of the investigations that have led to that? Do you think there is anything in that in regard to how we see the NACC, where we haven't seen public hearings and where the public don't get a view on the complexity of covert operations and the amount of work that goes into getting to the point of a public hearing, such as what we see in New South Wales? Ms Furness : I listen to every public hearing that the ICAC holds because I need to understand what's happening, including both tone and content, in order to deal with complaints, and I have not upheld any complaint I've received in respect of the use of coercive powers or the conduct of hearings—there have been no findings in the ICAC in respect of those matters. There's no doubt that the number of complaints to the ICAC increases somewhat dramatically when there's a public hearing. The chief commissioner either gave evidence about that or, certainly, has shown me data supporting that. To my way of thinking, the observer has to understand more about complexity—look at Operation Rosny, which is clearly very complex—has to understand more about the way in which they operate, including the use of compulsory examinations, telephone intercepts, data from phones and the like, and has to understand the amount of work that goes into presenting a matter in public and that the public hearing is rarely undertaken without there being a deal of evidence. Nevertheless it is still at the allegation stage, there is a deal of evidence supporting a public hearing. I think all of those are very important tools and an effective way of carrying out a prevention, if you like, and educative role for the public and the public servants. I know, from people I'm aware of in the public sector, that they all watch this. They read transcripts and they learn in real time what not to do. The NACC has different legislation, as we all know, and the test is different—a public interest test, largely, in New South Wales and an exceptional circumstances test for the NACC. However, the chief commissioner also told you of the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision where the exceptional circumstances test was held to be of—if I can put it this way—a slightly lower threshold than a decision in the Court of Appeal in Victoria. Like all things in the law, reasonable minds might differ as to what it means, but the NACC has that provision. It has to comply with it. It's a matter of discretion as to what are exceptional circumstances. It's not something that I could intervene in, in the absence of corrupt conduct or maladministration. Effectively that's a matter for the NACC and, ultimately, the parliament. Dr HAINES: Thank you. CHAIR: Senator Shoebridge. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Thanks again, Inspector, for your evidence and your help. For those who are following along at home, would you describe the difference between tier 1 and tier 2 investigations. Ms Furness : I can, but my description is probably imperfect. As I understand it, tier 1 are those complaints which can be dealt with quite quickly. They would include out-of-jurisdiction matters. They may include matters that are self-evidently individual disputes that would never meet the serious or systemic test and those which are just entirely misconceived. As I understand it, tier 1 is of that lesser, immediately understandable nature. Tier 2 is everything else. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: And what was your evidence regarding how long, on average, the time is for dealing with those tier 1 matters? Ms Furness : According to their submission, they do deal with the tier 1 matters within the 90 days, but, again, that's with the caveat that they're the ones that have been completed, not the ones that are actually still being considered. The NACC has said it's really hard to do the latter, and that may well be the case, but it means that the former is not particularly informative. I'm looking at page 24 of their submission, under 'Referral caseload'. They say that the average time for tier 2 matters to be closed from the referral date is 248 days, with a median of 202. And then, where there's a preliminary investigation, the average is 487 days, with a median of about the same. That's a long time. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: When we're looking at their data on tier 1, it's interesting they've said that their KPI is based upon matters that they close that were tier 1, but it doesn't consider matters that are still open that could well be tier 1. Have you asked them why they adopt those performance indicators? Ms Furness : I think they've explained that, or tried to explain it, in a number of forums before—to you, to the Senate estimates and in various documents. I don't understand it. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: You said one matter was 815 days from referral to decision. Do you know if that was dealt with as a tier 1 or a tier 2 matter? Ms Furness : I think, without being able to immediately bring to mind which one it was, it would have been a tier 2 matter. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: You indicate, in your description of it, that it caused quite personal concern to the complainant, partly because of the nature of the complaint. Was that right? Ms Furness : That's right. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: When you raised that with the commission, your submission says that their response was: … the Commission continues to receive a high volume of referrals. Was that really the beginning and the end of their response to it? Ms Furness : I set out some summaries of their responses just in order for the committee to understand them, but, as you can see, the reasons have been similar over the period of time. I might say that I have noticed that their communications with people who refer, particularly where there have been time issues, have been far softer and more apologetic—they're sorry that it's taken so long; they're sorry for the effects that that might have had on the referrer. So, in my experience in relatively recent times, the communication has been more sympathetic. Might I just add one matter about that. In New South Wales, complexity is their benchmark for KPIs, if you like, which, to me, is a better way of doing it. In the first six months, I had a complaint which concerned me, and I communicated quite a bit with the commissioner about that. Ultimately, as a result of that, they created a complex pathway, and they acknowledged that in their submission as well. I don't know how that's working in practice, but that was obviously a good solution to a very serious, complex complaint that was just languishing, whereas it should have been recognised earlier on. So they have that pathway. I'm not sure how it's being used. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: It is interesting how different the communication and the relationship between your office, as the inspector, and the NACC are at a federal level compared to your office, as the inspector, and the ICAC at the New South Wales state level. I'm particularly surprised at how different it is, because I largely cut and pasted the inspector legislation from New South Wales and we popped it into the NACC. It's almost an exact statutory mirror, so it's not a legal difference really, is it? In terms of the structures, they're almost identical. Ms Furness : The structures are different in that the chief commissioner has powers that are not overwhelming. That is one way of putting it. The commissioner at NACC is it—the commissioner is the decision-maker; the commissioner is the commission—and the deputies' work is entirely derived from the commissioner, whereas in the legislation, and certainly in my experience, it's a much more collaborative approach. Also, they're part time in New South Wales. There are two part-time commissioners. There are three full-time deputy commissioners in the Commonwealth. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: You talked about culture and cultural issues inside the NACC. How dependent is that on the leadership, given that role—the centrality of the commissioner at a federal level? Ms Furness : It's significant. The consequences for the organisation, from the leadership and the approach of the leadership to all the matters that we have been speaking about, are dominant. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Yes. There was one comment made by the former commissioner right at the end of his tenure which was a response to some of your work. I was asking him some questions about some of the work that had been done and the findings that had been made. I'll just repeat what he said: 'I remember very well that the inspector reported that I had made an error of fact or law, which meets the definition of officer misconduct.' I said, 'Correct.' He said, 'Given the very wide definition that any error of fact or of law amounts to officer misconduct, we now have a commission in which staff are terrified of making any mistake of fact or law because they fear they will be visited with a finding of officer misconduct.' Was that ever communicated to you by the commissioner? Ms Furness : No. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Has that ever been raised with you in any response from the commission, to explain perhaps delays or any conduct? Ms Furness : I suggest that the committee should ask the acting commissioner about her view of that. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: For me, one of the core things you need, if you're going to accept a leadership role, is to accept accountability. As I read that, that was institutional resistance to accountability that we were hearing here—a kind of resistance to the idea that your office would have an oversight role. Did you get that resistance? Has it changed? Ms Furness : I think the former commissioner's view of oversight and accountability is evident from the evidence he has given before you, before Senate estimates and in various submissions he's made. I don't think I can comment more on that. However, the chief commissioner at the ICAC is on record on many occasions embracing accountability and oversight. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: I assume you don't have a former MOU at a New South Wales ICAC level that— Ms Furness : Yes. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: There is? Ms Furness : It's virtually exactly the same MOU with New South Wales as I do with the Commonwealth. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: That is just about information sharing. It doesn't go into the culture and regular phone calls. It doesn't deal with that kind of granular detail—or does it? Ms Furness : Well, it does, to the extent that it deals with quarterly meetings and communication but also referrals of complaints, whether or not they precisely meet my jurisdiction or whether they're about statutory office holders; changes are being made. But communication is being discussed, certainly quarterly meetings, and I have quarterly meetings with the ICAC. I haven't had a meeting with the commission, say for July this year, since June 2024. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Did your MOU with the NACC have provisions in it for quarterly meetings? Was that not complied with by the NACC? How did those quarterly meetings not occur? Ms Furness : Well, they didn't occur. CHAIR: Senator, I am allowing a fairly wide range because I think some of this goes to some of our terms of reference, but I will direct you to try and bring your questioning to the terms of reference and assist the witness in doing it through that frame. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Public confidence in an institution, I believe, is supported when the public can see that the institution is properly oversighted. Did you raise the issue about the absence of quarterly meetings with the federal NACC? Ms Furness : No. Let me say, I could have either insisted upon or asked for them, and I didn't. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Yes. And that probably speaks to whether or not you thought there was a relationship where that would have fostered something positive for your role. Ms Furness : Yes. CHAIR: I've got two more people waiting, so I ask you to limit the following questions. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: You've said that the ICAC's assessment matrix relying upon complexity is something that might be—I don't mean to put words in your mouth—worthwhile considering at a federal level because it responds to the complex nature of an anticorruption commission's jurisdiction. If that was put in place at a NACC level, do you think that would assist in timeliness and communication with referrers? Ms Furness : It may well assist in triage in its literal sense. You would have thought the complex pathway that was put in place quite early on would have had that effect—that those that are more complex go on a different pathway. But, if you've got staffing issues and turnover of staff—so a lack of knowledge and experience—your delegations are set too high and your IT problems continue, they're all matters that I would have thought would go to timeliness as well. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: There's one final matter that I think we should raise with you. You determined not to continue and complete two or three referrals. Ms Furness : They were two complaint investigations. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Has your office received any public response? Has making that decision caused any difficulties with your office? Ms Furness : I've received fewer than a dozen complaints from individuals who are unhappy with that decision. I've received no what I call institutional or public commentary responses at all. I've not read anything publicly critical of that decision, which is not to say there hasn't been public criticism. It just hasn't come to my attention. So, no, it hasn't caused any difficulties at all, and it's saved money. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: How would you describe your relationship with the NACC since 7 July? Do you think it's on more positive footing? Ms Furness : There's no question that it's on a more positive footing. I have discussions with the acting commissioner on a regular basis. I've met with the acting deputy commissioners at least once, and we exchange information regularly. I have my first quarterly meeting next week, and we have an agenda. We've agreed to the exchange of information and a more collaborative method going forward. I certainly know that the acting commissioner has spoken with the chief commissioner to understand the different approaches not merely to oversight but more generally. I already have a positive relationship, and I have no doubt that it will continue in that direction. Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Thanks. CHAIR: Mr Hawke. Mr HAWKE: I want to interrogate one part of your submission. The NACC is telling you one of the principal reasons for the delay in all of the investigations and the processes that they're considering. They say here—and you say to us—'delays obtaining information from other agencies'. Do you accept that from the NACC? Are there delays from other agencies in providing the National Anti-Corruption Commission with information from Commonwealth government agencies or departments? Ms Furness : I can't give you an actual example, but I don't doubt for a moment that there are delays. There often are with other agencies. They may have their own priorities. It would depend on the complexity and volume of the information sought, so it doesn't surprise me. Mr HAWKE: But doesn't this go to the heart of something important about the NACC? It's new. It's operating within an established government framework and bureaucracy. The NACC is telling you that there are delays from agencies. I understand delay, but here they're citing it as a reason that they can't fulfil their functions, which seems to be pointing to something more serious. Do you, as part of your role, get to meet with secretaries of departments? Do you go to the secretaries meeting, for example? You're aware the secretaries meet regularly. As with freedom of information, there'll be officers assigned in every single department everywhere. Why are there delays from our agencies in providing information to the NACC? Ms Furness : If I refer to page 5 of my submission, I indicate that the commission said it was seeking information from another agency and ultimately had to resort to powers to compel the production. So I don't think it's a question of powers. It's a question of how I read this as to when they choose to exercise their powers, and presumably, if there's a particularly recalcitrant agency, they can exercise their powers; presumably they have the requisite conditions earlier. As to the other part of your question, I don't attend any of those meetings because my remit is extremely narrow—which is one agency—but I certainly have regular discussions with the secretary of the Attorney-General's Department. Mr HAWKE: Yes, thank you. I'm aware those powers exist, but here we're getting at something else. Most of the complaints that I'm seeing as a new committee member—and the people complaining about the processes—are about these agencies and departments, so surely delay from those agencies in responding is a very significant issue that the NACC is raising with you. Are you concerned about this? Ms Furness : It's only one reason of many others that have been given, and certainly it's not the dominant reason at all. The dominant reasons are related to the nature of the referrer and what has to be done. That reason I think was only given on one occasion. Mr HAWKE: Yes, I can see that, but you've cited it to us, and it's from them as well. Are you saying you haven't received enough evidence about what this means? Are we to read from your answer that this is some form of excuse from the NACC, or is it pointing at something more serious? Ms Furness : I don't think it's an excuse so much as an explanation as to why there were delays, and, given that it has occurred on an occasion that warranted this response—I don't know whether it's occurred on other occasions, but it certainly hasn't come up in their material—and that there is a power to compel production and therefore there is a solution available to the NACC, then it's not high on my radar. Mr HAWKE: Yes, well, I'll just ask again. Every single complaint that I've had somebody confidentially send me—or whatever—since joining this committee has been about a government agency. There seems to be an issue here if the NACC is saying there are delays from agencies. That could be a significant part. Delay is a well understood means of deferring people that are protecting corruption. Given that these allegations do pertain to activities or people or agents within each of these agencies, I just wonder if there's something systemic here that this is pointing to? Ms Furness : Just coming back to my page 5, it was in relation to one agency that they gave that explanation, and they did resolve it by compelling them. Mr HAWKE: I understand, but it does say in your submission 'themes emerging from the commission's reasons', so that's why I'm interrogating this matter— Ms Furness : Certainly if people raise it with you and have a concern, you're welcome to refer them to me. Mr HAWKE: Okay. So you don't have any understanding that there is any delay from Commonwealth agencies in complying with the NACC or its investigative processes or its offices at the moment? You've got one example you're referring to us. Ms Furness : I have one occasion on which they provided that as an explanation to me. Mr HAWKE: That wouldn't appear to be a theme, then, would it? It's just one example. Ms Furness : They're all examples. But, yes, what I've said is that I've said that the following provides details of the reasons given by the commission in respect of some of those matters. Mr HAWKE: If there is any further evidence, I think this committee would be quite interested in its oversight function if there are agencies that were delaying their responses to the National Anti-Corruption Commission. I'm sure every committee member would have a concern if that was the case. Ms Furness : I repeat my invitation—to those who contact you or any other member of the committee about that concern—to raise it with me. Mr HAWKE: Thank you, Inspector. CHAIR: Senator Darmanin. Senator DARMANIN: Thank you. I just wanted to go back to the beginning. In response to the chair, you made the comment that you think that you expect to see that the improvements that the NACC has put in would go a long way to addressing some of the timeliness issues that we've been talking about. How long do you think is appropriate before we see some improvement? Ms Furness : I think the NACC would say there has been improvement, and there may well have been improvement in some areas. To my thinking and, I think, to the NACC's, because there are a number of interrelated reasons for timeliness, each of them would have their own timeframe and each of them would have their own proportional impact on timeliness. So it's difficult for me to say. I understand, as a matter of general knowledge, that IT solutions are not easy, so, to an extent, that's a problem. I think delegations would be relatively quick to resolve. I certainly know the acting commissioner has made some changes to delegations. Staff turnover is a more difficult issue. Part of that is cultural, I suspect. Part of that is maybe workplace conditions, about which I know little. It depends on the reason as to how long, but I've got no doubt that the NACC will tell you about that when they give evidence. Certainly, I support the initiatives that they refer to in that section on performance standards. Senator DARMANIN: The reason I'm asking is that our role as oversight is to monitor over time. Do you think that the KPIs—there was a bit of a discussion about this earlier. I assume complexity benchmarks would form a part of those. Do you think that more qualitative KPIs, stretch targets, more accountability and more urgency might also address some of the issues that we've been talking about? Is this an area that you think we should be looking at? Ms Furness : KPIs can always be tweaked. I would have thought, given the concern within NACC, by reference to their submission and by reference to evidence about what the 90 days actually means, that may well prompt consideration of the KPIs. I know the ICAC has recently overhauled its KPIs because they have seen over time a change in the nature of complaints and the nature of the work they do. They have recently done that, and they've provided that information to the parliamentary committee over the ICAC and to me. Of course, an organisation concerned with efficiency and accountability would, one would expect, have regard to whether any changes are needed. It may well be that the new leadership of the NACC proposes to do that. Senator DARMANIN: I don't think this is covered in your submission, but I wonder if you have any comment on—particularly regarding your experience at the ICAC in New South Wales; they've dealt with this—the suggestion of the use of AI in a tool to assist in managing timeliness and volume and whatever else. Have you had any experience in the introduction of AI at the ICAC? Are there risks that are of particular concern? Is there anything else that we should be thinking about as we oversight as a way to address some of these issues as well? Ms Furness : The ICAC has entered into a joint research arrangement with, I think, the University of New South Wales to consider developing tools in relation to AI, as far as I understand. I know they've drafted—perhaps completed—a policy on the use of AI, particularly in assessments. I'm not sure quite where that's at, although I've seen either a copy, a draft or a finalised version which considers the stages at which artificial intelligence might be used or when you need people decision-making. It's high on their agenda. I think it's on the NACC's agenda as well. I think there is some collaboration between all the anticorruption commissions about the use of AI and also cybersecurity. So I think they both have it on their radar; I'm just far more familiar with what the ICAC is doing, and they are actively working in that area. Senator DARMANIN: Yes. I don't know if this is an appropriate question or not, but, in your observation of the complaints that you have received, do you think that the ongoing issues of timeliness pose ongoing risk in terms of ongoing corruption due to the slowness in responding to some of the things that are being raised with the NACC? Ms Furness : Well, that's always a possibility. I don't know that that would be high on my list of the biggest consequences of it, but, yes, that's always a possibility. It goes more to public confidence and public trust in an agency being efficient and effective in managing information it receives, because that information will largely be the source of investigations and therefore findings and perhaps recommendations. Senator DARMANIN: Thank you. CHAIR: Inspector, thank you for your evidence today. If you've taken any questions on notice, could you please provide your answers to the secretariat by 8 September. Thank you..