ANDERSON, Ms Erin, Technical Director, Asia-Pacific, Cowater International; and Member Representative, International Development Contractors Community FERNANDES, Ms Sophia, Senior Director, Chemonics Australia; and Member Representative, International Development Contractors Community HANSFORD, Mr Nathan, Chief Executive Officer, International Development Contractors Community LEWIS, Ms Emma, Executive Manager, Tetra Tech International Development PAKULA, Mr Byron, Strategy, Design and Quality Lead, DT Global [by video link] WINDER, Mrs Heidi, Acting Director, Humanitarian Preparedness and Response, Tetra Tech International Development [11:51] CHAIR:  Welcome. Although the subcommittee does not require you to give evidence under oath, I should advise you that this hearing is a legal proceeding of the parliament. The giving of false or misleading evidence is a serious matter and may be regarded as a contempt of parliament. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard and attracts parliamentary privilege. I now invite you to make a brief opening statement before we proceed to questions. We'll start with IDCC, then Tetra Tech and then DT global. Mr Hansford : Thanks, Chair. I'm here representing the contractors and the work on the aid program for DFAT. I have a couple of colleagues here as well. Sophia and Erin both come from companies that helped out on our submission. We also have Tetra Tech and DT Global, who are also both IDCC members and managing contractors. This morning, I'll speak to some of the sector-wide positioning, but you have the benefit of having a lot of managing contractors here today, so some of the key details that you're looking for will probably be directed more towards them. They'll certainly have the ability to address the issues on the ground that you're probably more keen on hearing about. You've all, of course, read our submission. I wanted to speak to a couple of issues coming out of that submission that I think are really important to frame today. The first thing we wanted to acknowledge is that IDCC as an organisation, on behalf of our members, really supports the continued focus and funding of Australia's aid program. Australia, as you know, stands out compared to almost every other aid donor in the world at the moment—having not cut the aid budget over the last little while—and we've all seen what's happened in the US. I think it's really important that that remains and that the aid program focused on conflict prevention continues to have that funding. If there are any recommendations that are coming out of the committee itself that are focused on conflict prevention that are additional to what DFAT is already doing, I think they need to be funded. There needs to be the funding for the capability and the tools if you're looking for DFAT to embed and focus on conflict prevention. Conflict prevention itself cannot remain an unfunded expectation that's placed upon an already stretched aid program. The second thing that we wanted to acknowledge is that there are a wide range of partners involved in delivering the aid program for DFAT. There are NGOs. There are civil society organisations. I know you've spoken to a lot of these already. There are multilaterals, local organisations in country, the private sector and, of course, the contracting community that we're representing here today. I think it's a real strength of the Australian aid program that we have all these different partners. They all have different capabilities, but we do work together around that same objective, particularly when we're looking at conflict prevention. One of the things we focused on as well is that 'one Australia' approach. I have no doubt you will have questions on that today. What we mean by that is Australia working together. It's all of the arms of statecraft, whether it's the development arm that we work with or defence or diplomacy. The way that we look at it is that there really needs to be a shared understanding of the risks that exist out there when we're talking about conflict prevention and how we as a group engage with those risks. All of those three arms of statecraft, I think, are really important to address those risks that we're looking to collectively resolve. The fourth thing that I did want to mention just briefly is that I think good policy really only becomes conflict prevention if it's built into the programs that DFAT has in the way that they're designed, intended and managed. I think that the way they're adapted over time as well is really important. We think that the procurement and program settings should really reward what we have called adaptive management. That's looking at sometimes providing for longer-term timeframes when they're needed. It's also looking at specific provisions for course correction over time, particularly when we're looking at programs that have that level of conflict prevention as part of their programming. They are the four things I wanted to flag early on. To summarise, I think Australia really needs to have a strong aid program. We need a clearer conflict prevention approach. We need a practical way—and I think we do have that—and practical settings that allow all of the different implementing partners to work together in what I guess I'd term as the right way. That's our opening. Hopefully, it wasn't too long for you. CHAIR: Thank you. Tetra Tech? Ms Lewis : Good afternoon. We are a development firm with more than 60 years of experience across the Indo-Pacific in delivering program management, research, evaluation and advisory services. We are a member of the IDCC and currently manage more than 20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade programs across 26 countries. As a key implementing partner for DFAT, our experience across the region shows that Australia's international development program is one of the most effective tools available to prevent conflict. Development addresses the root causes of instability over time, strengthening institutions, supporting inclusion and building resilience in ways that diplomacy and security measures alone cannot. Conflict is often driven by poverty, exclusion, weak governance, resource scarcity, and climate and disaster shocks. Development investments that improve sustainable infrastructure, disaster and climate resilience, education and livelihoods can reduce these pressures before they escalate to violence. Our submission highlighted four key recommendations: sustain ODA investments, recognising Australia's strengths in conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the international development portfolio; elevate regional partnerships and continue to invest in locally led approaches and regional interoperability; mainstream conflict sensitivity and make conflict prevention more explicit in programs; and enable novel ODA approaches and adjust procurement and contract models to enable flexible delivery. In closing, Australia's development program should remain a central instrument of conflict prevention because it addresses the causes of instability before they become crises and it does so in ways that are locally grounded, gender responsive and aligned with Australia's long-term interests. CHAIR: Thank you. DT Global. Mr Pakula : I want to build on what Nathan and Emma have talked about and build on this opportunity to appear today, and thank you for that. DT Global's submission makes a simple but important argument. Australia's international development program is not peripheral to conflict prevention. It is a critical pillar of regional stability. Development complements defence and diplomacy to prevent conflict, strengthen resilience and build trusted relationships across the Indo-Pacific. Central to Australia's development program is our national interest, including the pursuit of regional stability and security. Our region faces rising geopolitical competition, democratic backsliding, climate fuelled instability and disruptions from AI. For Australia to remain a trusted partner of choice in the Indo-Pacific, development assistance must be treated not as a nice-to-have but as a strategic pillar of Australia's conflict prevention architecture. Through delivering programs on behalf of DFAT, DT Global sees firsthand how development investments reduce fragility and strengthen social cohesion. In Papua New Guinea, the Building Community Engagement in PNG program is supporting local leaders to resolve grievances before they escalate into conflict. In Timor-Leste, the PARTISIPA program is strengthening village development and municipal administration systems, deepening trust between citizens and state. In Indonesia, the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice program is supporting legal reforms and strengthening the justice system, in partnership with institutions such as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. There are many more examples of this. These are not abstract development outcomes. They are stability outcomes achieved through the development program. Our submission also emphasises that conflict prevention is about not only what Australia does but how Australia does it. Development is most effective when it is working with local leaders, institutions, communities and organisations that understand the local drivers of fragility and pathways to peace. It must also be deliberately inclusive so that women, people with disability, young people and marginalised groups are treated as essential partners in building resilience. Our core message to the committee is this: development is a central instrument of Australia's statecraft. Used well, it prevents conflict before it escalates, strengthens the resilience of our neighbours and keeps Australia as a trusted partner in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. CHAIR: Thank you, all. I'll start with a big-picture question that goes to an issue that all three of your submissions converge on, and that's the need for a more explicit and coherent whole-of-government approach to conflict prevention. For example, IDCC's overarching recommendation calls for a 'One Australia' approach that aligns the development program with diplomatic and security engagement through 'shared analysis, joint objectives where appropriate and clear coordination arrangements'. DT Global similarly argues that development should be quite explicitly tasked and resourced as a strategic pillar alongside defence and diplomacy. From your experience of delivering programs on the ground, how effectively does coordination between lines of effort in the Australian government, between DFAT, Defence, AFP and other Australian government agencies, actually function in practice? Ms Anderson : Variable, I guess, is the answer. I think DFAT, the AFP and Defence do an excellent job in some extremely trying circumstances, but, having led the transition from RAMSI to the drawdown and a civilian authority which I led at that point, which was a managing contractor delivered platform, that experience is an example where I think there was excellent integration because there was a mandated authority that was resourced to support that coordination. I would say that is probably a flagship example of how Australia can do that, particularly when it transitions from a Defence led stance to a civilian led authority. Where I have seen it be less effective from my experience is, again, where that mechanism hasn't been effectively resourced and given a clear governance mandate to integrate the Australian agencies and entities and their interests. So I think it's very much about ensuring that, when it has gone well, it's resourced and that government agencies work together when they are given a clear governance structure and mandate to work within. Ms Lewis : We would echo the sentiments from Erin. As for our experience, I'll perhaps pass to Heidi to reflect on some of the humanitarian work that we're delivering and reflections on that. Mrs Winder : We manage three humanitarian programs on behalf of DFAT. We manage the Humanitarian Logistics Capability, which has a warehouse in Brisbane that can service 11,000 families with humanitarian relief supplies. We also manage the Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program infrastructure specialist unit. That's supporting the Pacific community to build 14 warehouses throughout the Pacific and in Timor-Leste to preposition humanitarian relief supplies before disasters strike. We also manage the Australia Assists program, which is Australia's largest civilian deployment capability, which has a roster of humanitarian professionals that we send to Australia's partners globally, whether that be to multinational organisations or to Pacific island governments, to build preparedness. I think there have been some really good initial wins in this area of working across government, whole of government, in the area of humanitarian response, particularly in working with Defence. As part of that humanitarian logistics capability, we work in lockstep with Defence. Just recently, we responded to Tropical Cyclone Maila and sent humanitarian relief supplies to Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea on defence assets out of Amberley. But I think, echoing everyone else's opinions here, that there is more we can do in that area. I think we at Tetra Tech see that we would value a more joined-up approach across working across government, where we have shared objectives, and if we could have programs that straddle across departments that are really looking at working more collaboratively, I think that would really be a recipe for conflict prevention for us to step up more from being output oriented to outcome oriented in that area. CHAIR: Does anyone else want to add to that? Mr Pakula : I'll add onto that if that's okay, but I'll be brief about it because I think my colleagues from the development sector have been pretty good in covering it. I was talking with one of my other colleagues last night on this topic. He's the country manager for Papua New Guinea, and we were talking about the Enga Province, where there's tribal conflict. I actually think about the quality of coordination not just in terms of the Australian high commissions and embassies for conflict prevention but broadly across the development sector as well. In that situation, DFAT really holds the role and responsibility of coordinating all the different agencies and programs across the Australian high commission. In Enga Province, there's tribal conflict, and the program that we're managing on behalf of the development side of things, the Australian partnership for law and justice, was asked to support the judicial system in that space, whereas DFAT has also got operating there the Australian Federal Police working in policing. You see both of these arms working quite collaboratively at a subnational level when it's driven by the high commission. That's where we see good examples that we think can be built upon. CHAIR: I'll give the call to Ms Jarrett. Ms JARRETT: I'll take a slightly different tack. I think it was Tetra Tech's submission that talked about novel ODA delivery and then said 'including in the private sector'. I absolutely agree that the private sector is a completely untapped area, whether that be through formal arrangements, public-private partnerships or just even tapping into the social engagement that a lot of big companies in the region have. Can you comment on that? Is that something we should be looking to as another channel for conflict prevention? I'll open it up to the floor. Ms Lewis : There are a couple of threads, which we will share across the representatives today. In terms of our submission, we had a number of intentions behind that. At one level is strengthening and enabling regional partnerships and locally led development and the types of scaffolding and support required around that. For example, across our portfolio, 60 per cent of our service providers are local organisations. In true number terms, that's 669. In being able to work effectively, there is support required around financial literacy, safeguarding policy and compliance to the contractual terms that we sign up to. It's about being able to provide support and meeting partners where they're at, which is a point in time and a continuum which will change. We refer to that as scaffolding. There are some other examples which would then enable, through that support, more flexible delivery arms. Similarly, for the private sector, it's about looking at different contracting forms—I think Sophia will be able to speak to this shortly—and some of the risk thresholds and appetites and different ways of engaging that can not only draw on the representation in-country of private sectors but have greater participation for a more diverse range of suppliers also. Ms Fernandes : One way we've been discussing this is by looking at other donor environments—which we all work to globally—where there are much more flexible, rapid funding mechanisms to really respond to crises and translate analysis into action fairly quickly. Those mechanisms mean you can operate and respond in a matter of weeks and months rather than years. You need to have, fundamentally, political economy and conflict analysis at the core that speaks to all your arms—that sort of whole-of-government, whole-of-Australia approach—rather than having siloed streams. That also means having a different risk appetite, as Emma was just speaking about, for engagement and for partnerships within DFAT and within all the arms of government. That means you can learn and adapt and test but at times also actually fail. The ultimate issue here is rapid response, and then learning and adapting and adjusting as you go. That takes a different mechanism than the current procurement systems that tend to fund large facilities that run for quite a significant period of time or, within those facilities, have the appetite to respond very quickly to what you might see contextually. We've seen this happen really successfully in other donor environments where there are certain mechanisms set up specifically for this type of mobilisation. Ms JARRETT: On notice, do you think you could share with us some of those examples? Ms Lewis : Yes, sure. Ms JARRETT: That would be terrific. There are large multinational companies in a lot of the markets that we have concerns about, and a lot of them have social engagement programs. You mentioned financial literacy. One that I used to work for does financial literacy; I'm not sure they do it in those markets or not. My point is: is there a way that we should be formally tapping into what they're doing as well? Because they obviously have a vested interest in security, peace, resilience, economic growth and preventing conflict et cetera. Are we missing something there? Ms Anderson : I can probably speak to that from, again, another donor context. Cowater International is a Canadian company. Canada's international development program integrates a lot more with some of its CSR priorities for Canadian companies that operate around the world, particularly in the resource sector. An example of where Canada does that is in some very fragile and conflict affected states—not in our region but in other regions—where those companies integrate into a broader Canadian led response and focus on their part of it. Obviously, being resource sector companies, their expertise is in that area and in working with landowners and local owners in those resource projects. They're very comfortable to participate in that way. But we see it work best when it's led by a whole-of-government response. Then the companies are participating in the areas where they most bring expertise and support, usually combined with development assistance from people like Cowater International, backed by GAC, which is the Canadian equivalent of DFAT. It's usually a joined-up response, and they're often more comfortable operating in that space where their mandate is clear. Ms JARRETT: Thank you. CHAIR: Mr Zappia. Mr ZAPPIA: Thank you, folks, for appearing before the committee. My question sort of follows on from Madonna's last question. How do we ensure that Australian aid programs don't duplicate the work that other countries are also funding? Are efforts made to coordinate the programs, using funding from a range of different countries? Ms Fernandes : Yes. Our previous submissions and interactions here at the committee really pressed for a conflict prevention framework. I think that is the underlying architecture that's needed to allow for that coordination to happen across programs within a singular context. Certainly, management contractors have a role to play, and we have played that role by coordinating joint technical working groups or coordinating across development partners, whether they be NGOs—multilateral or local—or government ministries et cetera to ensure that there's clear division of labour and clear areas to avoid duplications. That happens sometimes quite organically, but in this context DFAT also does need to play a role and their direction—if there is a clear framework that sits behind all of that—then allows us, as implementing partners, to have a clear way to engage in the wider ecosystem in the countries that we work in. We've seen, across the board, really successful examples of that in many of the countries that we work in, where we would facilitate that type of engagement as a matter of course. Ms Anderson : To jump in on that, that's the core role of DFAT often in country. For managing contractors, and certainly for everybody in the development ecosystem who's working with the Australian aid program, that's one of the key things that DFAT officers at post do: donor coordination across the different portfolios. The important thing is for them to have the personnel, with the expertise and capability, to do it at post. They do an excellent job of it, but it is a large amount of work that is often quite invisible, and it's important having the frameworks, as Sophia said, that back up that coordination response. They do rely on a clear governance framework for whatever the donor coordination issue is. At the moment, I see they do it extremely effectively for gender equality, for example. Australia really leads on donor coordination on gender equality. It would be great for a more joined-up approach in areas like conflict prevention. Mr ZAPPIA: I have a follow-up on that. To reverse the question, is there ever what I would refer to as 'competition' from different countries trying to provide aid to a particular country in order to win favour from that country? In other words, 'We're going to help you do this, and we're going to do it better than that country in order for you to perhaps do a trade deal or whatever with us.' Ms Fernandes : Similarly to the Australian aid program, development has been tied to national interests for quite some time. Without commenting too explicitly on other countries, I do think that that's been a common thread to development or ODA funding across many different donors. Part of the diplomatic work that DFAT does—and does so well—is to navigate some of those dynamics, probably more so than what would be the role of management contractors in this space. We would perhaps facilitate some engagement, particularly the information that may be coming from very localised scenarios, such as understanding things like local drivers and perhaps some sorts of early warning responses. The work that we do can certainly inform some of that positioning, but I think that sits well within the remit of DFAT. Mr ZAPPIA: Thank you. CHAIR: I can see that our virtual witness has their hand up as well. Mr Pakula : I will just add on to what's been said because I think this is a really important discussion, particularly when we talk about defence, diplomacy and development working together as statecraft. We do see good opportunities and examples where we are harmonising our development program with other like-minded countries. In Papua New Guinea, the Economic and Social Infrastructure Program is co-financed by FCDO, the UK government. It's an example where the two are working together to deliver energy to remote areas across the Pacific. For example, the PHAMA Plus program, which is agriculture development, is co-financed by New Zealand and Australia working with the private sector. We also do see contested situations. In Solomon Islands, for example, there are multiple donors working in the same sort of spaces. There is some competition around the Solomon Islands infrastructure program, which is really effectively delivering infrastructure, but there is competition for the hearts and minds of not just the people but the government representatives with infrastructure as well. So you do see it on the ground. As a managing contractor, our role is to support the Australian High Commission and the Australian government to deliver and meet the expectations. Mr ZAPPIA: Thank you. CHAIR: I believe Ms Jarrett has a few questions she wants to follow up on. Ms JARRETT: A different area, but thank you, Chair. We heard earlier that climate resilience is a risk factor to conflict. A lot of groups have mentioned that, particularly in terms of food security or scarcity, people displacement, impact on women, domestic violence and therefore the impact on children, economic strength et cetera. If you look across your world, what's the picture like in the Indo-Pacific in that space? What are we doing? What are other actors doing? Are there examples where we're seeing ODA done well? Do you see any gaps? I know that's a big question, but we're just trying to get a picture. This is a really high-risk area. How do we move forward? Ms Anderson : I've recently completed an evaluation across Cowater's global investments on gender and climate change, looking at how we do it well, where we can do it better and the key lessons from it. From that we learnt that the key thing is that, if you want to be addressing these issues that are so closely tied to climate change—conflict prevention, prevention of gender based violence, some of these extremely gendered issues that we see in the climate change narrative—you have to be doing it right from the beginning. When you design a climate change intervention, you need to be designing it for gender equality. You need to be ensuring that women and children and young people are at the core of that process. We often find in climate work particularly—I'm not sure why; I don't think it's ill-intentioned—that those groups are forgotten. It becomes quite a gender-neutral response. That can happen sometimes. We found from that work that there were really three key things. You have to do it right from the very beginning, very intentionally, to be impactful. You have to use very good quality data and get very good quality data on the gendered impacts of climate change. You also need to be looking at finance because finance is a key issue when it comes to climate change work. How most countries finance their climate change needs is actually one of the greatest political needs in the region right now. Finance is often not available to women and groups that actually need access to finance, so climate financing is a gender issue. It's extremely gendered. Climate financing instruments at the moment are quite gender blind, and they're missing the mark with the people who will be most impacted by climate change in our region, which is women and children and people with disability. We know that when there's a disaster, when there are significant climate change impacts, women and children and people with disability are actually the first and most impacted groups. We've got very good data on that. Ms JARRETT: That talks a little bit to another comment that I heard. Sorry, I don't mean to cut anyone off, because I really am interested in hearing from you all. It's a change in mind shift: looking at the outcome with women not as victims but as contributors to the solutions. Ms Anderson : Yes. We recently worked with the Asian Development Bank on disaster resilience in greater Vanuatu's Port Vila city area. As part of that project, women led the design for those disaster shelters. What we found—we can do a counterfactual because there are other disaster shelters that didn't take this approach—was that women brought things like thinking about safety for women and children in shelters and making sure that those shelters are safe spaces for women and children. They brought better accessibility, and they brought in the organisations of people with disabilities. They made sure that those shelters would work for everyone in the community. They thought about things like child care. When you are stuck in a disaster shelter for up to a week, who's going to look after all the kids? The mums can't look after the kids for 24 hours. It was a really interesting counterfactual study in how, when women and people with disabilities lead the design of responses—in this case, in terms of the climate disaster response—you get a better outcome for everyone. Ms Fernandes : DFAT, unlike other donors at the moment, actually has a very strong GEDSI policy and integration into its programs. That is a bit of a shining light at the moment when we're looking at other donors pulling back from ODA priorities in both climate and gender equality. It can't be understated how much an outward policy position drives and incentivises not just the development work and planning but also postdiplomatic engagements—and likewise for defence, going back again to that whole-of-government approach across defence, diplomacy and development. Ms Lewis : This is a great discussion, and it comes back to the investment in preventing the root causes of conflict. When we think about integrated development planning and whole-of-government approaches, we see opportunities for intentional programming on climate in, say, our education programs, working with children across a diverse range of areas to understand what the impacts of climate will be or participate in the types of design responses that affect them as young people in the region in which we work. It's also a continuum, and it's great to hear that design initiative of involving and making visible a diverse range of voices to make spaces appropriate. In a moment, I'll pass to Heidi for some of our humanitarian work. We would also see that need to be inclusive for both gender and more marginalised communities in the provision of infrastructure, which also speaks to some of the climate risks that we see across the region and how we bring greater participation of a diverse range of representatives within the community in that design response for infrastructure. Here, we are talking about whether it's multi-use shelters, which would also act as a school or a meeting hall of sorts, or whether it's marketplaces and the like. Those provisions do lead to better outcomes and consideration for resilience in the long term. Heidi, do you want to speak to some of the humanitarian gender approaches? Mrs Winder : Over the last few years, Australia has really put an emphasis on humanitarian work in the preparedness stage at the front of that continuum—the continuum being the international development space moving into disaster response, into recovery, back into stabilisation and then back into development. It's cyclical. A lot of investment has been placed in preparedness. In the Australia Assists program, we are prepositioning humanitarian specialists in the region, working with Pacific island governments to help them prepare for disasters and working with foreign governments to prepare in times of response. To give you an idea of some of the modest contributions that we're making in the Middle East, for instance, we have some humanitarians who are working to support UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which we've signed up to as a country. They're supporting other countries in the Middle East with their national action plans, not only to design them but to implement them as well. It's about assisting these countries in thinking more about the gender aspects than purely about participation but also ensuring that women get to influence decisions on security, governance and resource allocations. As we've spoken about just now, the evidence shows that, when you give women opportunities or agency, they tend to make good decisions for communities and families. These are some of the contributions—modest contributions—that we're doing in the Middle East through the humanitarian programs that we're implementing. Ms JARRETT: DT Global? Mr Pakula : Again, this is a really interesting topic for us, and we could talk about this for a long time. I note there's also a parliamentary inquiry into gender and the development program as well. I just want to pull back a little bit and talk about how the Climate Resilient Communities program is a way for DFAT to integrate climate across the development program. Similarly, you see something like Pacific Women Lead integrating gender inclusion across parts of the program. When DFAT sets a priority and that priority comes through the strategies into the development partnership plans into the procurement processes et cetera, the implementation is done to a very high standard. We have examples of that in climate, and we have examples of that in gender. To go back to the terms of reference for this parliamentary inquiry, it's less so on that complex sensitivity side of things. That's part of the recommendations that we have put forward around integrating it into DFAT's way of working, if that is a priority for us. I think there are some overlaps with climate and nature based conflict—for example, the scarce resources around food, water and energy, particularly in the Pacific—whereas we're operating in a very bifurcated world; Asia has very different sorts of issues, and there it's about integrating climate adaptation and mitigation into infrastructure, for example. Again, there are lots of good examples to draw upon, and I'd be happy to share some if you'd like further discussion. Mr Hansford : We talked a lot about climate. We talked a lot about gender as well. I think it's other conflict drivers as well. I'll just pull one out of the air: a lack of trust in government organisations. There's a lot of work funded by DFAT on governance programs, public finance programs, institutional building programs that are there in and of themselves, but they also have that restriction-of-conflict focus. I can't remember if it was Erin or Emma that was talking before about embedding that conflict prevention in the design and then, as Byron was saying, all the way through, from the development partnership plans to contracting. It's really important for all the drivers of conflict as well, and there are lots of them. As you flagged, gender and climate are really important ones, but there are a lot of others. Ms JARRETT: Thank you. CHAIR: I'm going to ask a bit of a practical question around how conflict sensitivity interacts with program delivery and practice. I want to put to you the evidence that the Development Intelligence Lab gave this morning in the hearing. Their submission recommends the implementation of a resilience monitoring system to track key indicators over time, and that would trigger earlier incremental adjustments to programming. It implies that analysis needs to be connected to decision-making in a way that changes what's funded, when and where. I know that IDCC's submission also recommends investing in 'a standing capability that synthesises data and partner insights to support early identification and mitigation' and points to the UK's XCEPT program and the FEWS NET food security early warning model as international comparators that Australia could learn from. In this context, in the programs you manage or represent, when the monitoring systems that you use identify things like rising grievances or institutional stress on the ground—things that could lead to conflict over time—what actually happens next, now, in the current system? What's the response of Australia's ODA institutions to that when you're seeing it on the ground? Ms Fernandes : I might start and then hand over to my colleagues, who will have, I think, really concrete examples. Where it's worked well in other donor settings—certainly, FEWS NET and XCEPT are programs that Chemonics have been running for some time—is where development programs have really docked in with government, defence and diplomacy priorities. A good example is in Afghanistan where, for a long time, Afghanistan's stabilisation initiatives meant that development programming was working in areas such as livelihoods and cash for work, looking at inclusion and gender equality issues and looking at financial reform with ministries. In working very closely with local partners, NGOs and research think tanks, you're bringing that exposure and analysis very regularly into your overarching conflict and political economy analysis that's informing back to post—in this case, US government post. That's probably going back to what Development Intelligence Lab were talking about—research and analysis capability being held centrally is critical not just to inform DFAT but to inform across Australian government initiatives. While these programs—for example, in Afghanistan—focus on building communities and trust with government, at the same time they're working alongside areas where military and diplomatic actors are also engaged in stabilisation. So you have a feed of information flow that's informing across the diplomatic strands. In practice, that has meant development investments reinforcing wider security objectives by strengthening local governance and legitimacy in very fragile and conflict affected areas. Certainly, I know Tetra Tech can speak to the humanitarian side of things, but that means that you're able to respond to shocks much more rapidly and flexibly, and inform that decision-making and response not just on a development angle but across into your defence and security sector portfolios as well. Ms Anderson : I can talk to a very specific example. Cowater, on behalf of DFAT, delivers INKLUSI, which is the Australia-Indonesia Partnership Towards an Inclusive Society. This is an eight-year program. It follows on from a 10-year investment that DFAT had in a similar area. This program works in 800 villages across Indonesia, working through local civil society partners who are very established in Indonesia, many of which we've had a 40-year relationship with. How that works in reality, on the ground, is that those organisations monitor local levels of conflict around a whole range of dimensions but particularly look at identifying the most marginalised groups in those villages, who are often a lightning rod for conflict at the local level. Then, through that human security lens, they work to ensure, first, that there's a preventive framework in place. They work with local governments and village heads to ensure that local conflicts can be resolved at a local level and that they don't escalate. The second part to that is where they start to see a growing trend; they start to see conflict escalating. That rolls up through the partner network to national civil society partners, who will work firstly with the Indonesian government because, in any time of conflict, the key thing is the sovereign role of the country in which we're operating and the role of that government in their own conflict prevention responses. So that rolls up where a partner might be seeing very specific conflict around, say, natural resource developments in a particular region. They'll then bring that to the national level and say to us, in the Cowater team, 'Can you support us to have a dialogue with the Indonesian government around the conflict that we're seeing in this region?' We'll support that dialogue, and generally there's very good government response. At the same time, we'll communicate that there is that growing conflict and concern to the DFAT team that work very closely with that program. So you've got this good connection supporting the Indonesian government to respond to an address and be aware of its own local level conflict settings, at the same time as ensuring that DFAT is aware of those issues and how Indonesia and its own partners are responding at the local level to those issues. It's very hard, as a metric, to measure, but over nearly 20 years of support we have seen, consistently, that mechanisms like that basically support the prevention and diversion of conflict before it occurs at the local and provincial level in Indonesia. Mrs Winder : What are we doing currently in relation to this? In the humanitarian space more broadly, there's a very comprehensive ecosystem that activates through the multilateral system and the cluster system that gets stood up to activate when there is conflict. We have a very flexible contract model with the Australian government through DFAT to pivot to respond to emerging needs through the Australia Assists program; we always reserve funding to do that. We will get requests through this international framework to support in times of crisis, and we will make sure we work in lockstep with the department to say: 'These are the types of requests that we're seeing through the multilateral system. How does this align with Australia's national interest? What types of roles would you like us to put forward from our humanitarian roster to respond to that?' If I can speak to one particular area: since 2018, when the Rohingya fled from Myanmar across the border to Bangladesh, in the camp, Australia has supported 72 humanitarian deployments into that camp over time, with a focus on food distribution but also a very strong focus on gender. We have some amazing humanitarians who go in there and focus on accountability to affected populations and are working with agencies like UNHCR to come up with complaint and feedback mechanisms. From the reports we've received from them, they're receiving about 1,000 calls a day through some of those accountability conflict and feedback mechanisms. The programs that Australia is supporting and sending humanitarians in to support, in areas of crisis, are making sure that affected populations and refugees have an opportunity to be heard and, also, that they're receiving timely information and understanding what the referral mechanisms are so that some of those tensions can be defused at the point before tensions arise or get worse. CHAIR: DT Global, do you want to add anything? Mr Pakula : I think this is an important question. There are different examples, but I'd like to pull out two capabilities that are important for DFAT. One is what was being discussed around flexible adaptive management, being able to reallocate resources within existing contracts to meet evolving needs. The other one is having emergency response capabilities within the development program. I'll touch on three examples, which are very different, as to how monitoring systems can inform development delivery. The first one is around Bougainville. Bougainville is a post-conflict situation. It was a really, really messy civil war over a long period of time. In that situation, to prevent conflict, it's a long-term focus around establishing justice systems through, as an example, the law and justice program. That is long-term thinking and long-term strategies. The Solomon Islands is a different example. There we see tensions with people in Malaita, who see those on Guadalcanal as having better services, better infrastructure and better education. The program there that we're delivering for DFAT, the Solomon Islands Education Sector Support Program, is building education infrastructure schools in Malaita. It is training teachers to try and reduce the tensions around uneven human capital and human development and the inequality that exists between those islands. If I look at a third example, where it brings in the emergency response capability, biosecurity is an area. Papua New Guinea had African swine fever. It was very impactful on a lot of communities and a lot of families, but it also led to increasing sorcery accused related violence, SARV. There was gender based violence et cetera, and the whole-of-government response with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, CSIRO and DFAT, through the PHAMA Plus program, was around not just responding to that emergency but also reducing the tensions in that community. They are very different examples of how the monitoring systems operate. Essentially, having flexible and adaptive ways of working, and emergency response capabilities, gives DFAT the levers to act on what they see. Ms Fernandes : If I may add one more point on that recommendation for capability: what's important to remember is that both in the case of XCEPT, which is a Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office funded research capability, and FEWS NET, which is the Famine Early Warning System Network—which was funded by USAID, now funded by US State—they're both global public goods. Those governments are investing in a capability that not only their own governments can utilise but other governments can utilise, as well as other actors. That might speak to a piece that Development Intelligence Lab was speaking to this morning—investments on top of current development, ODA investment. CHAIR: Thank you for your evidence today. If you've been asked to provide any additional information, including answers to questions on notice, please forward it to the secretariat by Friday 5 June 2026. Please note that responses to questions on notice will be published on the website as submissions to the inquiry. Members, if you would like to provide additional questions on notice for witnesses, please provide them to the secretariat by close of business Monday 11 May 2026. Witnesses, you will be sent a copy of the transcript of your evidence to assist you with answering questions taken on notice today, and you'll have an opportunity to request corrections to transcription errors. Subc ommittee adjourned at 12:46