deZOETEN, Ms Sarah, First Assistant Secretary, Defence and National Security Policy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ISBISTER, Mr Jamie, Deputy Secretary, Development, Multilateral and Europe Group, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade KANG, Mr Pablo, First Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Regional and Mainland Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade SCOTT, Mr Steve, First Assistant Secretary, Humanitarian and Civil Society Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade STOREY, Ms Sarah, First Assistant Secretary, South and Central Asia Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade TATTERSALL, Mr Mark, First Assistant Secretary, Polynesia Micronesia and Development Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Subcommittee met at 08 : 00 CHAIR ( Mr Watts ): I now declare open this public hearing of the Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for the inquiry into the role of Australia's international development program in preventing conflict. I would like to begin by acknowledging the traditional owners of the land on which each of us is joining today, and I would like to pay my respects to elders past and present. I also acknowledge the cultures of any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples present with us here today. This hearing will be broadcast on the parliament's website, and the proof and official transcripts of the proceedings will be published on the committee's webpage. I now welcome representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to give evidence today. This hearing is a legal proceeding of the parliament, and the giving of false or misleading evidence is a serious matter and may be regarded as a contempt of parliament. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard and attracts parliamentary privilege. I now invite you, if you would like, to make an opening statement before we proceed to discussion with committee members. Mr Isbister : Thanks, Chair. We have provided a written submission. I might just give a few opening comments and then open it up for any questions people may have. The importance of this submission is obviously that we've got a world that is under very significant change. The current Middle East conflict highlights the costs that conflict has on societies and economies. We know that it's the greatest factor that undermines economic development, trade and countries' security. We're also facing an increasingly challenging global environment, as we see the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, as mentioned, the current impact the Middle East conflict is having, not just in the Middle East but, obviously, globally, including here in Australia. We're facing an environment with greater strategic competition, with intensifying inter- and intrastate conflicts. We're also dealing with the increasing impacts of climate change, which is driving greater displacement and humanitarian needs, including in our region, where Pacific island countries would see climate change as the greatest security threat. Preventing conflict, particularly in our region, is central to Australia's own economic prosperity and security. When conflict occurs, as mentioned, it drives displacement. We've currently got almost 120 million people who are forcibly displaced, and we've got the largest refugee camp in the world in our region—Cox's Bazar, with 1.2 million people. IMF estimates assess that every $1 invested in preventive measures to conflict, such as development efforts, can save between $26 and $100 in future conflict related crises. We know the costs of conflict in our region. The RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands cost the Australian government at the time well over $3 billion, and, over the four years of the conflict, GDP dropped by 24 per cent. We know that the conflict in Bougainville had generational impacts on communities not just in Bougainville but elsewhere in Papua New Guinea. With the closure of the mine, it closed 16 per cent of the PNG government's revenue. We also know that the ongoing conflict in the highlands of Papua New Guinea has a direct impact on the communities in those regions—most particularly women and girls. We know that, when conflict occurs, women and girls are the most heavily impacted by crises. In humanitarian crises, women are 14 times more likely to be impacted by or become victims of sexual and gender based violence. I think the key thing in our submission is highlighting the important role Australia's development assistance has in investing in preventing conflict. It's never going to deliver that alone, but it has a key role in that. Well-targeted development assistance can help prevent conflict, particularly in how it reduces inequality and particularly in how it gives opportunities and jobs. Over recent years, the government has increasingly looked at how we can better align our development program to countries in our region and also at investment in regionalism. My colleagues can talk more about some of that work. I think one of the key things with the development of our country development partnership plans is that it's about how the development program aligns most effectively with countries' own needs. They're also a lever for how we have conversations with countries—to use that as a multiplying effect, to deliver both broader economic benefits and collective security. We've used our development program, in partnership with other tools, to ensure that we can maintain banking services in the Pacific, including digital connectivity. As mentioned in our submission, by the end of last year, every Pacific island country had some undersea cable connectivity, which is critical for their ongoing inclusion in and ability to be part of a global economy, as well as their access to health and education services. In partnership with the development program, we've used the investment with Telstra to purchase Digicel, the largest mobile phone company in the Pacific. We've used new tools as well. Our Pacific Australia Labour Mobility program, the PALM program, delivers almost $500 million in remittances back to communities in Timor-Leste and the Pacific island countries. As mentioned, one of the key ways we've used the development program is in how we have more honest conversations with countries about how we need to invest in and have assurances around our collective security. Some of the investments I mentioned that we've made in our region—the recent stepping up, including on climate financing and some of our sports diplomacy work—have been key elements in how we've had conversations to secure agreements such as the Falepili agreement with Tuvalu, the recent PNG Pukpuk treaty on defence and, obviously, the Indonesian defence treaty. There are broader issues in the multilateral system of how we invest in conflict. One that I would flag is, obviously, Australia's leadership at the end of last year at UNGA, where we led an effort to shine a light on and prevent attacks on humanitarian workers. The two years with the greatest number of humanitarian workers killed since the Second World War were 2024 and 2025. With other countries, we've managed to get over 110 countries to sign onto that declaration, and we now implement that declaration to prevent attacks, particularly on local workers, in countries like Myanmar and Sudan and in the Middle East. I'll stop there. I'm very happy to take questions. My colleagues can talk more specifically to some of the ways the development program is responding to conflict prevention in the region. CHAIR: Thank you for your submission, and thank you also for the senior-level attendance at this hearing. It is a reflection of the seriousness that DFAT accords to this issue, so thank you on behalf of the committee. Regrettably, the Hansard for our previous hearing isn't online yet, but a theme of the previous hearing, where we met with academics and aid delivery organisations, was essentially a recognition of the deep expertise that DFAT has in conflict prevention. It's a deep expertise in particular in conflict exposed or conflict-at-risk environments that we operate in but also a view that much of that expertise and knowledge is implicit. It exists with individuals at either post or maybe RG Casey, and it's not made explicit in an explicitly articulated conflict prevention framework. There's not an explicit institutional architecture for sharing and coordinating conflict prevention efforts. Would you be able to describe how those coordination efforts happen across the functions in DFAT and then across government between DFAT, Defence, AFP and other organisations operating in these areas and maybe respond to that view that there needs to be an explicit articulation of the way we go about conflict prevention. Mr Isbister : I'll make a couple of overarching comments on it, and others may want to add to it—Sarah might particularly in terms of some of the work that's been done in our region. In the past, we did have a conflict fragility section that sat within, at times, Steve's area. I think that was an area where we looked at a much more centralised approach to conflict prevention, including having people with levels of expertise on it. I think, to be frank, over the last five years, we've realised increasingly that the best way that we can address a conflict is having it most directly embedded into the bilateral and regional partnerships and dialogues that we have. In terms of our region, that's understanding what the early warning systems or issues are where we might be seeing risks of conflict and then about how we're using our foreign policy development and whole-of-government efforts to best address those. Obviously, particularly in Papua New Guinea—we have a very big post in the Solomon Islands and across the Pacific, where we bring the whole-of-government equities together. Though there's a need, often we'll use interdepartmental committees to ensure that we're delivering joined-up effort on that. How we're actually best using the different tools is most effectively done by those resources and representatives in country in discussions with counterparts on addressing those. In terms of the multilateral system, it's obviously broad. There are lots of different elements—in terms of the Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Security Council, UNGA—so our multilateral division absolutely does have a role in terms of coordinating how we're thinking about our efforts in the multilateral system and conflict prevention. There's certainly expertise that we have in that, both in our New York and Geneva posts but also back here in Canberra. The final element I'll touch on is how we've looked at embedding the conflict prevention element more regionally—what we're doing through the Pacific Island Forum and what we're doing through ASEAN and through regional bodies. If people recall, the PIF agreed to the Boe security declaration back in 2018-19, which provided a platform for how the region was going to look at and address the risks to our collective security and potential conflicts of that. So I think leaning more into that regional element has been one of the key focuses, particularly over the past five-plus years. Sarah, do you want to add any more, particularly on conflict prevention? Ms deZoeten: Sure. As Jamie alluded to, we've fairly recently created the Conflict Prevention and Strategy Branch, which sits within my division. That is not intended to take over from the conflict prevention work which is embedded because, as Jamie said, for us, conflict prevention and peacebuilding is core business of the entire work of the department. It has been a core element of diplomacy since history began. It's also, of course, a central element of the development program, so it is absolutely embedded across and close to those country and regional teams and development teams which are most associated with the tensions and the root cause issues that are relevant to their geographic responsibility. This branch is intended to support and engage across the system, with a particular focus on reducing and deterring the risk around interstate conflict, including between great powers. Of course, the National Defence Strategy has articulated quite clearly that we are now within a 10-year warning window and that that 10-year warning window has been lost. What does that mean for how our department supports the government's agenda around having a secure, peaceful and a prosperous region? We are very focused on those connections between the department and the Department of Defence in particular and how we work together to maintain peace in the region and how we collaborate, if you like, as arms of the levers of statecraft that the government has open to it to maintain peace. So that's the role of this branch, but we work incredibly closely with other parts of the enterprise and organisation, which are either working through ASEAN or the Pacific Island Forum or indeed country or regional programs, as we all work towards maintaining peace. CHAIR: And in that coordination between agencies, is there a documented, agreed position across government of how we think about conflict prevention? Is our approach to conflict prevention both consistent and agreed on across Defence, AFP, DFAT? I suppose what I'm saying is that there's the view that was put to us in the previous hearing that strategy doesn't exist unless it's written down. Is this something that we are dealing with on an iterative basis or on an ad hoc basis, or do we have an agreed strategy that everyone has bought into across government? Mr Isbister : I'll touch on some of the development stuff, and then you could talk about the broader foreign policy elements of it, Sarah. The government launched an international development policy. It does have conflict prevention is a key element of the policy. It highlights that, as I mentioned, we know that conflict is the biggest underminer of a country's economic and national security. The government also launched—I think it was a year and a half ago, almost two years ago—the new humanitarian policy. Again, the humanitarian policy highlights, as a central part of it, the importance of how we use our humanitarian program to invest in disaster risk reduction due to both climate impacts and also conflict impacts. It talks about the work we do about our protracted funding, how we provide multi-year funding that best addresses situations that we're currently facing in Syria, Lebanon and Myanmar. And so embedded very much in those policies is how conflict prevention is a central element of how we think about our programming, our selection of partners and our dialogues with countries. That's something which obviously drives our coordination, not just across DFAT but with the NGO sector, with UN agencies and with other government departments that we work with, including with the AFP and the ADF, particularly in the Pacific region. But is there anything you want to add, Sarah? Ms deZoeten: Sure. There are a range of strategies, as you'd imagine, which exist in terms of how we take forward our foreign policy objectives. Conflict prevention is a central part of all of those because, of course, that's the ultimate objective—preserving peace and stability and prosperity in the region. For us, there are a range of strategies that we have which convey the effect that we would like to have in our region, which is, of course, around a stable, peaceful and prosperous region. Conflict prevention is a key element of those strategies. To your point about how we work with other agencies, the very standing up of this division is an element of that deeper integration with us and the National Intelligence Community and Department of Defence. Not a day would go past where I'm not talking to colleagues in the Department of Defence. We work hand in glove as we take forward these objectives. CHAIR: I'll pass to Ms Collins for questions after one further question on this. I just wanted to give you an opportunity to respond to this. I think it was Ms Templeman who put a question on notice about the Rimmer report, and we've sort of understood the context of that. It was a pre-Covid report that didn't come to completion. The world's changed a lot in that time. But some of the interim recommendations from that evaluation that were shared with this committee align with those assessments about the need for coordination and explicit strategy. The evaluation says: 1. Elevating conflict prevention and peacebuilding as a central element in Australian foreign policy requires a high-level mandate—ideally across agencies. 2. Regular and ongoing inter-agency cooperation and funding arrangements support coherent approaches and enable shared prevention-focussed analysis and planning. Can I take it from the evidence before us that DFAT's view is that that recommendation has been addressed by the structures and new processes that have been put in place since then? Mr Isbister : Yes. I would definitely say that. From Susan Harris Rimmer's report recommendation, I don't think the argument is about establishing a separate conflict prevention policy that overarchingly drives it. But, if it were, I don't think that's how we would see our approach to it or the most effective way to respond to it. I think what the recommendation was getting at is a more concerted, proactive approach to how we think about conflict prevention, driving across the way that we think about our foreign policy, our bilateral regional partnerships and how we utilise the development program most effectively. That's absolutely what then led to the development and focus on the new international development policy, the new humanitarian policy and the establishment and elevation of the work in conflict prevention in Sarah's team's area as well. Some of this, we can't go into it as publicly, but the only thing I'd also mention on this is to reassure that, very regularly, when we're tracking early warnings or emerging risks on potential conflicts, we work closely with ONI and facilitate scenario planning across government around how we are assessing the potential future risks of issues and how we then try and ensure that we are responding to those. What does it mean for different levers of our efforts? We know we've got the PNG election in mid-2027. We've got the current challenges around the Bougainville discussions on independence. All of these are, potentially, triggers. They all very much inform pretty regular scenario planning on that that occurs across government that brings Defence, DFAT, the AFP, Attorney-General's and other parties together. Through our development partnership programs, which inform not only how we use a development program but some of how we want to work with the PNG government, the Solomon's government or whoever to try and support them to mitigate and prevent the risks of those conflicts emerging. Senator COLLINS: It's a real pleasure to be here listening to your testimony this morning. I've done a lot of work in this area, and I'm a big believer in our development program. It builds on these questions, really. I'd love to help you square the circle on the fact that the development indicators in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are all going backwards. The risks are getting greater. Conflict is increasing, especially for women at the local level. I've heard you talk about strategy today. It sounds very regional and top level. I was helping the US government with their Global Fragility Act in Papua New Guinea. They're trying to turn that conflict prevention upside down and do things radically differently. I don't know how effective that was in Papua New Guinea because they only had seven million bucks to spend over 10 years or something. After decades of investment and so many billions of dollars invested into somewhere like Papua New Guinea, where we seem to be going backwards, are we now at a point where we have to start thinking differently about the strategy that we have there? You've just set up a conflict strategy branch. Does that have to now be front and centre of the development program that we have? Are these the sorts of conversations that you're having? Mr Isbister : First of all, we acknowledge that the situations in Papua New Guinea and, one might argue, more broadly, in Melanesia continue to face real issues, particularly, as you said, in terms of the development indicators, the achievements of the Sustainable Development Goals. Whether you argue it's going backwards, without doubt some of the indicators, in relation to the attacks on, security of, and marginalisation of women and girls, continue to have terrible impacts on those concerned. Yes, we always need to be continually looking at the economies and communities in Melanesia, in terms of our engagement with them. As I mentioned, we've got some very big events coming forward in the next 12 months in PNG—the elections, Bougainville. We need to continue to look at how we best address that. One thing I would say though is that it's always easy to look at where more needs to be done and what is going backwards. There are two things that I would say on the PNG example. One of them is: it's always hard to identify what hasn't occurred or what could have occurred otherwise. Last year was 50 years since independence for Papua New Guinea. It's still a relatively new country. It's bringing together over 800 different tribal groups. It's a nation that is still struggling with issues. Yes, there's conflict in different parts of Papua New Guinea, but it's a country that is growing and is holding together, which is something that we can't forget within that. We should at least celebrate some of those achievements. Even on the economy side, there's unequal economic growth, but some of the benefits that PNG is getting from its resources are significantly higher than they were a decade ago. The recent IMF program has been critical in terms of addressing some of the economic and fiscal challenges that PNG faces. I'd simply say that it's why it's our largest development program. I'd argue that our development program has been key to trying to prevent conflict and provide economic opportunities. Without some of the work on the banking efforts, aviation and that—PNG probably wouldn't have the connectivity it has now without the investment from Digicel. You wouldn't have communities across the Pacific having access to financial services. I'm not in any way dismissing the negative indicators and challenges, but it's probably also worth highlighting that what the scenario might look like without that would potentially be significantly worse. Senator COLLINS: On the local level and all of that—you raised mining, and you raised women—a lot of the conflict, as you say, happens at a very local level. One of the things that constantly comes up is a recommendation for our aid and development program to be more locally focused and more flexible in the way that it can provide that aid. Something that I have advocated for a long time is—it's very specific—safe houses for women right across Papua New Guinea. We talk about conflict prevention. That's very difficult to do when you've got long-running economic inequality across the highlands, for example, but we could be providing conflict protection. There are these huge gaps. It's the same with the mining communities. That's where a lot of the conflict happens. Do we have strategies around being more local about our conflict prevention and protection? Mr Isbister : I might ask Mark if he wants to comment or add anything in terms of both PNG and the Pacific more broadly on the conflict. Mr Tattersall : Thanks, Senator, for your interest. I acknowledge your work and background in this space as well. I was struck by our own submission. You look at the list of countries at risk of institutional and social fragility, and there's a sprinkling of Pacific nations, including those in Melanesia, the Solomon Islands and PNG. That's obviously right on our doorstep. Governments of both persuasions have recognised the scale of that challenge, and we are changing the way we engage with the region. There was the Pacific Step-Up under the previous government, and there's now a cabinet agreed Pacific strategy that addresses the challenges of the region in a fundamentally whole-of-government way. That brings together our development investments, which are longstanding, with new ways of working across the defence and security space and greater levels of coordination with Defence and AFP investments in transnational crime, which is such a growing threat for the region. We are thinking about new ways of working, and we are entering transformational arrangements with a range of countries, as you're aware. We are doing things differently. Does the region continue to face challenges? Quite obviously. But we're working in a local way to address those challenges where there are particular examples of conflict. You mentioned PNG and the highlands. It's obviously a huge focus for our team in Port Moresby and beyond to address those issues in a local way. You mentioned the idea of shelters. We do invest in shelters across PNG. We can do more, obviously, so we're happy to look at that. As Jamie mentioned, our broader international development policy actually has a very strong focus on locally led development. In each of our investments, as well as in our country-level strategies, we are required to assess whether we're adequately using locally led delivery mechanisms. We have to balance that in all contexts. In a country that's already as decentralised and fragmented as Papua New Guinea, we do want to make substantial investments in the centre and in the government, but we need to address local challenges as well. That's really the structural challenge we face. We're happy to have further discussions about how we might adapt and address those emerging challenges in where you're interested. Senator COLLINS: Those safe houses are really important. The last time I checked, and it was a couple of years ago, there were only about seven, with most of them based in Port Moresby. They can have such a massive effect. There's one that's actually a warehouse up in the highlands. It's got hundreds of women. They're making bags and selling them. It is economic development, bringing jobs and opportunities to these women. It's changing their lives. It's amazing. So I'll just advocate for that. CHAIR: I've certainly visited that one up in the highlands. I was very proud to see it being run by a Victoria University alumnus from my electorate in Melbourne's west. Ms Templeman. Ms TEMPLEMAN: Thanks again for being with us. I know more than I did when we last had an opportunity to speak because I spent a week in PNG, courtesy of the Gates Foundation with the Save the Children program. That was a terrific education to see the work on the ground and to talk to your colleagues there, who are clearly putting their heart and soul into the work that they do and the transformation it can make and recognising the scale of the challenges there. There are two things I was interested to get your thinking on. One is how the real commitment to local partnerships assists with conflict prevention in the programs that you do. We obviously looked primarily at health and education but also at some of the hydropower, so there were a range of projects, but the local partnerships came through as a very strong theme. How do they fit with conflict prevention and build resilience around that? The second one is around the agenda—how the focus on women and children supports conflict prevention. My experience was PNG, but I'm happy for you to take it more broadly. Mr Isbister : I'll make a few comments, and I might invite Sarah and then Pablo or Mark, if they want to talk about any specific elements of the localisation and the gender issues in terms of the programs we've got. I'll say two things. First of all, thanks for visiting PNG, you and the delegation. I think we might have said that we think it's really critical that parliamentarians visit the region, because it sends a really important message to those countries that Australian parliamentarians are interested in the challenges, the stories and the perspectives. Hopefully, as you said, it then gives you a perspective and an understanding of how Australia is responding, both good and bad, and what we can do better. I think that's helpful. I think the localisation issue is absolutely central on this. It's partly this point: when we look at conflict prevention, it needs to be looking at the great state—great powers competition and what that means in terms of our foreign policy, and it needs to be looking very much at the bottom-up elements of that. That's why we believe that it's not a one-policy approach on this. It really needs to be thinking at the different levels. I think the localisation is flagged as an embedded part—if you look at the development policy and the humanitarian policy, it's very much a central part of that and a much stronger part than it was before. I'll be honest enough to say that we've still got to do better at it. It's not easy, because localisation comes with less control, greater risk and, at times, less coherence, because you're having to trust and invest in local priorities and efforts. That may not always necessarily be driven from the Australian centre. Having said that, in PNG, one of the examples that I think has really worked well on this has been the Church Partnership Program. It's been going now for well over 20 years. Eighty per cent of health services and 50 per cent of education services in PNG are provided by church based agencies, not the government. So part of that was how do we harness relationships and empower those local education and health facilities and centres to be able to get the resources and better make decisions on that? That program has demonstrated that it's been effective going forward. I think there's still more we can do, in particular, with how we make linkages back with Australian providers and more strong Australian-Pacific or Australian-PNG connections in these areas. The other one I think is in Steve's area, which is the Australian Humanitarian Partnership program. Its investment in Red Cross and local organisations around their own disaster preparedness and their own early warning systems—still a way to go, and there are challenges. But that's been another program. We're looking at how we further enhance and strengthen that, and the government announced a just under a hundred million dollar investment over—is it eight years? Mr Scott : It's 10 years, and it's the same amount for the Red Cross partnership. Mr Isbister : Yes. On gender equality, I'll be honest. It's a real challenge in Melanesia. The number of women involved in the formal parts of the democratic process is very low. It's an issue which our new ambassador for gender equality, Michelle O'Byrne, is very focused on. She's travelling up to PNG soon. She has visited Fiji. How do we look at different, creative ways to ensure there's greater participation not just for parliamentarians but through other parts, whether it's in media, in civil society or in other roles that allow that voice or perspective to be heard? Without that, unfortunately, the decisions when it comes to budgets and finances too often exclude the very real perspectives of women and girls, who are often, as I have said, the greatest victims of conflict. But I'll ask other colleagues if they want to add anything in terms of your broader points about localisation and gender in other parts of the region. Sarah, did you want to— Ms Storey : Sure. I will just try to combine a couple of things. You've mentioned, for instance, the very high level. Yes, we have those strategies and policies, as Ms deZoeten has pointed out. Then we look at the regional level. My region, South and Central Asia, is the most conflict affected subregion of the Indo-Pacific. Then we go down to the country level, and we look at very localised factors. So, if I look at the factors that are driving instability in some of the countries in my area of responsibility—for instance, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have all seen governments overthrown by populist youth-driven movements. What is driving that disaffection among the youth population is a lack of opportunities and skills. The World Bank, for instance, has estimated that in South Asia 18 million to 20 million young people come into working age every year, but only a third to a half of them are going to actually find jobs. The statistics for women and their participation in the labour force is even less. That's why we partner with local governments but also at a much more localised level. To take that localisation principle further, for instance, in Bangladesh, we partner with BRAC, which is one of the—I think it is, in fact, the world's largest NGO. We deliver very localised programs around training and workforce participation, and some of these have a particular focus on women and girls. We're always assessing what the drivers are for instability—they may be non-state actors as well as these social and economic factors—and how we address these. I'll give you a really rough list of what we do in my area. We try, through our very modest development program in this part of the world, to boost inclusive economic growth through skills development programs. We build skills of future leaders such as through the Australia Awards program. As Mr Isbister noted, we really focus on boosting connectivity—South Asia is the Indo-Pacific's least connected region. We try to focus on programs that foster unity, social cohesion and reconciliation after conflict—for instance, in Sri Lanka. We support substantial governance programs, such as those around the conduct of local recent elections in Nepal and Bangladesh which returned both to democratic governance. And we support regional cooperation through boosting regional architecture. They're just some heads of much deeper engagement that give you a sense of the complexity of that effort. Mr Kang : Good morning, committee members. My patch covers our relations with ASEAN and bilateral relationships with Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. I guess it's fair to say that, in the countries that I have responsibility for, unlike the story we just heard, there's not much prospect of popular overthrow of governments. I just want to make a couple of points. It's a bit of a grab bag because of the nature of what I cover. There's been reference made to Myanmar both in terms of our submissions and in terms of some of the comments made here today. Clearly, conflict mitigation is the fundamental first objective of our development program in Myanmar. I use the words 'conflict mitigation' because, obviously, the horse has bolted on conflict prevention. But, under that objective, we are funding a range of organisations both in country and across South-East Asia more broadly to support, where we can, inclusive dialogue to reduce tensions and to promote peace-building efforts. Very much as part of this, we try to ensure that women and other marginalised groups play a role in these processes. A big focus of our development cooperation program with Myanmar is on gender equality and reducing gender based violence. On gender equality, Cambodia is a good example. We've been working in Cambodia for decades to help them address the very serious problem that we also have of gender based violence. I might, Senator, follow on from your comment about safe houses in Papua New Guinea. We support a range of safe houses in Cambodia for victims of gender based violence to provide them and their children with shelter and to help them with access to justice for ongoing court processes. That's a very important part of that program in Cambodia. On ASEAN as a whole, because I know a lot of our discussion today has been about either high-level strategy or locally led projects, I want to emphasise the role of declaratory statements and also the role that we, across government, play in negotiating those. ASEAN specialises in a lot of these statements, but we have a strong view that, over time, they can lead to changes in government behaviour and government-to-government behaviour. In the context of conflict prevention, I note that, at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in October last year, our prime minister and the leaders of ASEAN agreed on a leaders' statement on conflict prevention. That basically talks about the role that we and ASEAN can play in terms of having our own agency to prevent conflict in the region. There are a couple of examples already of intra-ASEAN conflict and, in the case of Thailand and Cambodia currently, stalled conflict which could reignite at any time. Then there are broader issues—for example, around the South China Sea, where it's in all our interests to work very hard on conflict prevention. So that statement has been adopted, and we're looking to see how we can roll it out in our development programs. It's also the 50th anniversary this year of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. As we support the Philippines, chair of ASEAN this year, we're looking to see how we can build on what we've done in the declaratory sense on conflict prevention into programs that are more concrete. CHAIR: I'm conscious we have 15 minutes left. Senator DEAN SMITH: Just briefly, I'm very interested in one of the comments in the submission, about the use of diaspora groups, and then in your comments, Mr Kang, about what we might do out of country. I'm keen to understand how well developed that is as a strategy. And, just using these stories, can you point to some specific initiatives that are working well in terms of how we are using diaspora groups to facilitate greater cooperation, understanding and conflict resolution so that, when some of our neighbours do hopefully get to a position of domestic calmness or lack of conflict, these external elements can be a positive contribution to peace. Mr Kang : In relation to Myanmar, all I would say there is, as you would appreciate, Senator, it's quite a different way from how we do our development cooperation program. Normally we would agree with the other government on the shared priorities and then have a development partnership plan that we both sign off on. Obviously, we do have that plan in relation to Myanmar, but we don't engage the regime on that. So I think, in terms of working with diaspora groups, it's probably much more of a focus for us than it would necessarily be in other bilateral development programs that we have. As you know, we work very closely with implementing partners on the ground in Myanmar, and that's a combination of local groups, international NGOs and multilateral organisations. But of course, because of the sensitivities around revealing who we support and the potential risks that that involves, we don't tend to go into that. But we do very much, as part of our development cooperation program and in putting it together, consult very widely, including with those diaspora groups, given the nature of how we deliver development assistance. Senator DEAN SMITH: I've got one more, if I might, Chair. I'll turn to the matter of agility. How agile is our thinking and how agile is our responsiveness, given that things are now changing very, very quickly—so the ability to stay aware of those factors influencing change and then respond to changing circumstances? Mr Isbister : I'll make one comment, and, Steve, do you want to add some of the stuff on the humanitarian side? One of the drivers around the development partnership plans was actually having a live document with countries that informed how we were utilising our development program partnerships with countries, and that was able to shift and realign where need be in response to crises. I think we're now a year and a half into many of those—in terms of their reviews of what's worked and what hasn't. The environment at the moment is probably challenging us more than ever before to be responsive and flexible because of how quickly the region's changing, the number of ODA cuts that we're facing in the region and the need for us to think about how we align in that. That's required us to make some very hard decisions. Good programs we previously funded—that's no longer a good enough reason for us to continue to fund them, because there are other programs that are more critical for both meeting development needs and contributing to prevention of conflict, as well as for our own bilateral interests. You'll see in some of the ways we've engaged with countries on the use of development programs in new bilateral partnerships that we've been, I think, quite flexible in how we've realigned those efforts. But I'll be honest with you, Senator. We can do better on this. The challenge for governments—in bureaucracies you establish systems for good reasons—is in trying to evolve those systems, whether that's through funding mechanisms or contracts. Pivoting them is easy in theory, but in practice it has its challenges. So we've got a way to go, I think, on how we respond to climate needs and climate financing in the Pacific. We've got to think differently. Two big drivers, beyond the geostrategic issue, are the potential changes of technology and access to artificial intelligence and digital connectivity—what that's offered in terms of fintech options and solutions in the Pacific in ways that we didn't have three years ago. How we can potentially use AI to help with access to education, health, telehealth and other things is something which I think we need to look at. CHAIR: We're going to have bells ringing in five minutes. Mr Gosling, Ms Jarrett and Mr Zappia, if you would like to ask your questions collectively, we can get a joint response. Mr GOSLING: This question is for Mark and maybe someone else. I've noticed that the Papua New Guinea government is trying to do a gun buyback and trying to have fewer weapons up in different areas to prevent tribal warfare or whatever. It seems like a sensible idea on the face of it. Are we providing assistance to that program, or is that something they're doing independently? Mr Tattersall : I'll need to take that, specifically, on notice. I don't know whether we're providing direct support to that initiative, but we are engaged very substantively in anti-conflict and conflict prevention efforts across PNG, particularly in the highlands, where we have specific programs that are working to both anticipate and respond to conflict. The prevalence of high-powered weapons is obviously a huge concern in that regard, and it's a growing challenge for the country. Fundamentally, we're committed to working with the government to address it. I don't know whether we're directly supporting that initiative, though. I'll need to get back to you on that. Mr Isbister : I know the AFP's pretty engaged on it. If you recall, in the Solomons and Bougainville conflicts, gun amnesty programs were a key part of that, and the government was heavily involved in looking at how they worked with those governments to reduce access to small arms. As you've seen, it's a huge issue. As I said, we'll come back to you with more details, but I know the AFP and ADF are pretty heavily involved in looking at some of that. Mr GOSLING: This seems like a very practical and direct way to assist the conflict prevention efforts. CHAIR: Ms Jarrett. Ms JARRETT: One thing we've hardly talked about today is the potential role of the private sector in this space, whether that be through how we improve public-private partnerships or even just tapping private sector led initiatives that can support what we're trying to achieve. They have local people on the ground, they've got expertise, they've got capabilities, they've got philanthropic intent et cetera. So I'm just wondering if we can better activate that. Is it part of our overall strategy? Maybe this is a question on notice, given it's a big question—or you could make a quick comment too. Mr Isbister : I'll make a quick comment. It is part of the strategy. I'd say that there are elements where we are doing it—certainly more so than in the past. I mentioned the issues around banking and digital connectivity and how the private sector is definitely a driver on that. The other part of it, I think, is how we're using infrastructure. We've still got a way to go on this. There's frustration that some of the large infrastructure programs in the Pacific have not been harnessing local businesses and providing the job opportunities that come with that. As flagged earlier, there is a risk of job opportunities, or lack of them, being a driver of conflict. Philanthropics—we can do better. It's easier said than done. They're very specific in what they often want to do, but I think there is a space. We've got to look at ways of having dialogues to bring philanthropics more effectively into some of the work across the Indo-Pacific. Ms JARRETT: Yes, and I'm talking about the philanthropic programs of the big multinationals—the people who've got the money and the capability in those markets. Mr Scott : One practical example we have already is PowerOn. It's a partnership with the power companies here. We send their linesmen out to rebuild the power networks after cyclones and tsunamis and things in the Pacific, and they love doing it. Mr Isbister : There's actually quite a few of them from diaspora—Tongans, Samoans—who work for power utilities here and then go back often. CHAIR: Mr Zappia. Mr ZAPPIA: I'll be very brief. A number of the Christian churches provide very localised humanitarian programs in a number of those countries. My simple question is this: are they helpful, or are they a hindrance? Mr Isbister : Both. Honestly, it's this point about localisation and centralisation. They're absolutely critical, because the localisation role that churches can play is really important. The CAN DO network we fund—the Church Agencies Network—is one of the key partners under the Australian Humanitarian Partnership. But they're also very decentralised. It can be very messy. It can be hard to coordinate. So it's also a challenge, but that's not a reason not to work with them. There's just a need for us to continue to keep that dialogue going. CHAIR: Finally, if Hansard can pick this up, I want to recognise the extraordinary work that DFAT has done in driving the launch of the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel, now joined by more than 100 countries. Obviously, it's designed to incentivise countries to make pledges for concrete measures to keep humanitarian personnel safe and enable them to do their work in conflict and disaster zones. Consistent with that, in the last term of government, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—this committee—completed an inquiry into the review of the operation of the amendments made by the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Act, and recommended: … the Australian Government, in consultation with the humanitarian sector, amends the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 to provide a standing exemption from all sanctions measures for legitimate humanitarian assistance, consistent with the approach taken in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2664 (2022). We've heard from many humanitarian groups before this inquiry that the protections afforded to them as Australians are different to the protections afforded to them by US, Canadian or UK legal regimes. Perhaps, given the context, it's best to take on notice, but I reiterate the committee's ongoing interest in the progressing of this matter. If you can provide a further update on what's being done to respond to this recommendation to implement sanctions exemptions for legitimate humanitarian assistance, that would assist the committee. Mr Isbister : I can assure you it's being focused on in Steve's area. Legal are engaged in it. We'll come back to you on it. CHAIR: Wonderful. Thank you for your attendance. Subcommittee adjourned at 08:56