Light@ASPI_CTSAustralia and South Korea: leveraging the strategic potential of cooperation in critical technologiesExecutive summaryCooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the ROK) in a range of critical technology areas has grown rapidly in recent years. Underpinned by the Australia – South Korea Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation signed in 2021, collaboration is currently centred around emerging technologies, including next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Such technologies are deemed to be critical due to their potential to enhance or threaten societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors.1Intensifying geostrategic competition is threatening stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly alarming is competition in the technological domain. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies and focuses on high-impact research, reveals a stunning shift in research ‘technology leadership’ over the past two decades. Where the United States (US) led in 60 of the 64 technologies in the five years between 2003 and 2007, the US’s lead has decreased to seven technologies in the most recent five years (2019–2023). Instead, China now leads in 57 of those technologies.Within the Indo-Pacific region, some countries have responded to those shifts in technology leadership through the introduction of policies aimed at building ‘technological sovereignty’. The restriction of high-risk vendors from critical infrastructure, the creation of sovereign industrial bases and supply-chain diversification are examples of this approach. But a sovereign approach doesn’t mean protectionism. Rather, many countries, including Australia and South Korea, are collaborating with like-minded regional partners to further their respective national interests and support regional resilience through a series of minilateral frameworks.The Australia – South Korea technological relationship already benefits from strong foundations, but it’s increasingly important that both partners turn promise into reality. It would be beneficial for Australia and South Korea to leverage their respective strengths and ensure that collaboration evolves in a strategic manner. Both countries are leaders in research and development (R&D) related to science and technology (S&T) and are actively involved in international partnerships for standards-setting relating to AI and other technologies. Furthermore, both countries possess complementary industry sectors, as demonstrated through Australia’s critical-minerals development and existing space-launch capabilities on one hand, and South Korea’s domestic capacity for advanced manufacturing on the other.This report examines four stages common to technological life cycles — (1) R&D and innovation; (2) building blocks for manufacturing; (3) testing and application; and (4) standards and norms. For each, we examine a specific critical technology of interest. Those four life-cycle areas and respective technologies—spanning biotechnologies-related R&D, manufacturing electric-battery materials, satellite launches and AI standards-setting—were chosen as each is a technology of focus for both countries. Furthermore, collaboration through these specific technological stages enables Australia and South Korea to leverage their existing strengths in a complementary manner (see Figure 1). Supporting the analysis of these four stages of the technological life cycle and selected critical technologies is data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker and the Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index (COSTII) jointly released by South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP).Informed by that examination, this report identifies a set of recommendations for strengthening cooperation that is relevant for different stakeholders, including government and industry.Policy recommendationsBiotechnologiesAustralia and South Korea can enhance knowledge-sharing in biotechnologies-related R&D through people-to-people exchanges. Links should be formalised through an MoU between relevant institutions—such as Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology. An MoU could be used to implement initiatives such as a virtual mentoring program and long-term in-person exchanges (preferably at least 12 months in duration). Such exchanges would support immersive in-country interaction, enabling the transfer of specialised R&D expertise. Australian researchers could share knowledge about advances in early-stage clinical trials processes, while South Korean researchers could contribute insights into synthetic biology and AI tools in drug-discovery clinical-trial methodologies. Financial support from Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council could facilitate the exchanges.2There remains a need to address visa constraints impeding the free flow of researchers between both countries. While this report focuses on R&D, we suggest that there’s equal value in considering cooperation in the manufacturing stages of the biotechnologies value chain.Recommendation 1:Formalise links between Australia’s and South Korea’s key biotechnologies R&D institutions by facilitating long-term people-to-people exchanges aimed at transferring specialised expertise. This includes in areas such as clinical trials, synthetic biology and AI integration in biotechnologies.Electric batteriesAustralian companies should consider the production of battery materials, including lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials (pCAM), through joint ventures with South Korean battery manufacturers. Such ventures would benefit from jointly funded and owned facilities geographically close to requisite critical minerals. Since spodumene is needed for lithium hydroxide and nickel, cobalt and manganese are required for pCAM, Western Australia provides the ideal location for those facilities. Furthermore, BHP’s recent suspension of its Western Australian nickel operations provides an ideal opportunity for a South Korean battery company to purchase those operations— securing nickel sulphate supplies necessary for pCAM manufacturing.3There’s also the potential for South Korea to invest in cathode active material (CAM) manufacturing in Australia by taking advantage of the co-location of mining and pCAM operations.The provision of loans with relatively low interest rates from South Korean Government–owned banks,4as well as tax credits and energy incentives provided by the Australian Government, would assist in offsetting the relatively high operational costs (including for labour and materials) associated with establishing joint battery-material plants in Australia instead of South Korea.5Environmental regulations will need careful consideration in assessing such proposals, such as those covering the disposal of by-products. In the case of sodium sulphate, that by-product can be used in fertilisers and even recycled for future use in battery-material manufacturing.6Recommendation 2:Consider the establishment of facilities in Australia under joint venture arrangements between Australian and South Korean companies to enable expanded production of battery materials (including lithium hydroxide and pCAM).Space and satellite technologiesAustralia and South Korea should establish a government-to-government agreement that would facilitate the launch of South Korean satellites from northern and southern locations in Australia. This would be similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement. The agreement would increase the ease with which companies from both countries can pursue joint launches by streamlining launch permit application processes, export controls, taxation requirements and environmental regulations. The agreement can establish a robust framework for joint operations and continued R&D in space and satellite technologies while ensuring that both countries protect associated sensitive technologies. Any such agreement should prioritise consultations with community stakeholders to further inclusive decision-making focused on addressing the social and environmental impacts of space launches.7Engaging with Indigenous landowners to ensure the protection of cultural heritage, sacred sites and traditional land stewardship is particularly key.8Recommendation 3:Establish a government-to-government agreement similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement to bolster the ease with which Australian and South Korean companies can conduct joint satellite launches on Australian soil.Artificial intelligence technologiesCloser collaboration between Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards will be beneficial. The established positive record of Australian and South Korean stakeholders in relation to international norms and standards relating to critical technologies, and comparative regional strengths, provide a means to ensure that international AI standards continue to evolve in a way that fosters interoperability, innovation, transparency, diversity and security-by-design. One recommended body through which Australian and South Korean stakeholders could coordinate their respective approaches is the international, industry-led multistakeholder joint subcommittee (SC) created by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) known as the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Subcommittee 42 on AI (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).Recommendation 4:Coordinate the approach of Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards in international technology standards bodies, for example, through ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.Full ReportFor the full report, pleasedownload here.11 Dec 2024Australia and South Korea critical technologiesMon, 01/13/2025 - 10:07markopetreski@…AttachmentDownload3.91 MBProgram link/program/international-cyber-policy-centreReferences1aspi.org.auJ Wong Leung, S Robin, D Cave, ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 28 August 2024, online.2Austrade, ‘Australia: A go-to destination for clinical trials’.3bhp.com‘Western Australian Nickel to temporarily suspend operations’, BHP, 11 July 2024, online.4mining.com.auGovernment-owned banks in South Korea are currently funding a similar joint venture in the form of the POSCO – Pilbara Minerals lithium hydroxide facility in South Korea. For more information, see A Orlando, ‘POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution executes US$460 million loan agreement to help fund chemical facility in South Korea’, Mining.com.au, 27 February 2023, online.5www.afr.comIn particular, the high cost of a joint lithium hydroxide plant in Australia rather than South Korea was the primary reason for the joint POSCO – Pilbara Minerals plant to be built in Gwangyang, South Korea. For more information, see P Kerr, ‘Lithium processing is 40pc cheaper in South Korea, says POSCO’, Australian Financial Review, 22 May 2023, online.6worley.comM Stevens, ‘Cathode manufacturing: solutions for sodium sulphate’, Worley, 29 May 2024, online.7asiapacificdefencereporter.com‘Koonibba Test Range launches large commercial rocket’, Asia–Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), 6 May 2024, online; J Hamilton, A Costigan, ‘Koonibba looks to the future as a rocket launch site, but one elder is concerned about the impact on sacred sites’, ABC News, 11 May 2024, online.8abc.net.auM Garrick, ‘Equatorial Launch Australia lodges plans for expansion to 300 hectares for Arnhem Space Centre’, ABC News, 8 November 2023, online.AuthorAfeeya AkhandResearcherFull bioAngela SuriyaseneeResearcherFull bioAcknowledgementsASPI acknowledges the Ngunnawal and Ngambri peoples, who are the traditional owners and custodians of the land upon which this work was prepared. We pay our respects to Elders past and present.We would like to thank all named and anonymous stakeholders who worked with us to bring this report to life in what’s been a one-year-long project.Numerous ASPI colleagues reviewed and shared their insights for this report, including Justin Bassi, Bill Paterson, James Corera, Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Dr Jenny Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Dr Malcolm Davis, Chris Taylor, Bart Hogeveen, Dr John Coyne, Sangsoon Lee, Tilla Hoja and Henry Campbell. A special mention to our former colleague Mike Bareja, who was invaluable in shaping this report in its early stages.In July 2024, we were privileged to gather insights from participants at the Australia – Republic of Korea Critical Technologies Track 1.5 dialogue, including Dr Jungmi Cha, Dr Eunjeong Cho, Suon Choi and Dr Peter K Lee. This Track 1.5 was co-hosted with South Korea’s Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI), which also reviewed a draft of this report and translated the Executive summary into Korean. Thank you to STEPI’s Dr Chi-ung Song, Dr Yongrae Cho, Dr Ji Hyun Kim, Dr Dongwook Seoh, Seona Lee and Aram Lee for their ongoing assistance.On the South Korean side, we consulted the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) through Yi Joo-Heon. Furthermore, the Korea Institute for Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP) assisted us with the integration of data from the MSIT and KISTEP’s 2023 Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index into this report.On the Australian side, we consulted the Australian Embassy in Seoul, including Sam Hwang and Priscila Kim, the Australian Trade and Investment Commission through Julie Quinn, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, including Dr Rebecca Doolan, the Department of Home Affairs through Adam Robens and Milly Pink, as well as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.Last, we are grateful for the insights provided by individual experts including Nadia Court, Ross Gregory, Dongkeun Lee and John Lee.About ASPIThe Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online atwww.aspi.org.auand in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality and innovation, quality and excellence, and independence.ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the authors and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.ASPI Cyber, Technology & SecurityASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security (CTS) analysts inform policy debates in the Indo-Pacific through original, rigorous and data-driven research. CTS is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, foreign interference and issues related to information operations and disinformation. CTS has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building and internet safety, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues. 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