SHAREShare to FacebookShare to TwitterShare to LinkedInShare to EmailPrint This PostWith ImagesWithout ImagesNuclear deterrence, with its inherent risk of annihilation, cannot remain the bedrock of international security. Nuclear states, particularly great powers, can and should work on new conventional strategic options that can effectively deter aggression without posing an existential threat tohumankind. Developing viable alternativesisnecessary if we’re ever to move towards global nuclear disarmament.One possibility is adisarming strike—the use of strategic non-nuclear capabilities calibrated to swiftly degrade an adversary’s ability to wage offensive war. Unlike a nuclear counterforce strike, which would involve a pre–emptive nuclear attack against an enemy’s nuclear arsenal, a disarming strike would rely on conventional and cyber capabilities to target critical military systems and infrastructure. It would hold at risk the key sinews of enemy military power—leadership, communications, logisticsand major war–fighting systems—through a combination ofmassive cyberattacks,electromagnetic pulseweaponsand other conventional capabilities. The goal would be to deter aggression by threatening to render a significant portion of the enemy’s military machine inoperable, rather than by threatening massive loss of life.Theincreasing integration of artificial intelligenceinto defence capabilities can exponentially increase the accuracy, speedand power of non-nuclear disarming strikes, thereby strengthening their deterrence potential. AI-powered systems can process vast amounts of real-time data from a wide array of sensors and intelligence sources to identify, track and target an adversary’s critical military assets with unprecedented precision. They can optimise the timing and coordinationofstrikes to maximise their disruptive impact on the enemy while minimising collateral damage. For example, swarms of AI-guided drones and missiles could autonomously locate and neutralise an adversary’s key leadership nodes, communication hubs, supply linesand offensive forces in a matter of minutes. The prospect of havingitsmilitary infrastructure paralysed beforeitcould even launch an attack would give any aggressor serious pause.Furthermore, AI-enhanced systems can ensure the robustness of second-strike capabilities by making them more resilient, dispersed and autonomous. AI could enable a dense, multi-layered web of early–warning sensors and interceptors to shoot down incoming missiles. Drone swarms and uncrewedvehicles could be pre-deployed in hidden locations, guided by AI to survive initial attacks and retaliate when ordered. With AI, states could credibly threaten precise, certain and devastating retaliation to aggression without necessarily revealing the full scope of their capabilities in advance.If harnessed responsibly and effectively, AI has the potential to bolster strategic stability by ushering in a new era of‘mutually assured debilitation’. By convincingly holding each side’s military infrastructure at risk of severe debilitation while being less destructive and more discriminatingthan nuclear bombs, AI-driven non-nuclear deterrence could proveto bea compelling alternative to the grim doctrine of nuclear MAD. The knowledge that an adversary possesses AI-empowered, always-ready counterstrike abilities that can’t be easily discovered and neutralised would significantly enhance deterrence, reducing the temptation for pre–emptive attacks or provocations. It may offer a viable path for nuclear powers to eventually move away from relying on doomsday weapon systems for their security, making the world a safer place.This vision of AI-driven non-nuclear deterrence is not without its potential pitfalls.Anincreasing reliance onAIand complex cyber capabilities introduces new vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to hacking, algorithmic biasesand unforeseen errors in autonomous decision-making processes. Such systems could potentially lower the threshold for conflict initiation,assome statescouldpossibly engagein cyberwarfare and strategic strikes with less forethought than they would otherwise with nuclear weapons. The ambiguity in international law concerning cyberattacks and AI warfare complicates matters, potentially leading to miscalculations or unintended escalations. Additionally, there remains the moral quandary of increasingly automated warfarein whichthe human element is progressively distanced from the act of war, potentially eroding accountability.Despite those concerns, it remains a moral and strategic imperative to explore alternatives to nuclear deterrence. The current war in Ukraine hasincludedan unsettling number ofnuclear threats, echoing the hair-trigger tensions of the past. More concerningly,recent war-gaming scenariossuggest that AI systems are likely to resort to nuclear escalation in a crisis. Even if nuclear deterrence has historically prevented great–power war, its infallibility for the future is not a given. A single misstep could destroy the entire human race. The worldhas comeclose to the brink at least twice, first during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, then during NATO’s 1983 Able Archer exercise. For the sake of humanity, we must put the nuclear genie back intoitsbottle. That will require us to imagine credible alternative forms of deterrence.