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Patience, Please: AUKUS Pillar 2 Is Indeed Making Progress

The Strategist

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Date Published
19 Apr 2024
Priority Score
3
Australian
Yes
Created
8 Mar 2025, 02:41 pm

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AUKUS Pillar 2 has a PR problem—and no, not just among sceptical regional partners.   Compared with evident progress on Australia’s future submarine capabilities under Pillar 1, analysts have often decried a lack of detail or ...

Summary

The article examines the progress of AUKUS Pillar 2, addressing its perceived lack of visible advancements compared to the more tangible outcomes of Pillar 1. It argues that despite these perceptions, substantial progress is being made in regulatory harmonization and operational efficiency, laying the groundwork for future defense technology cooperation among the AUKUS countries. The analysis highlights the importance of setting appropriate expectations for Pillar 2's timeline and outcomes, considering the complex challenges involved in defense industrial integration. This discussion is relevant to global defense policy and cooperation frameworks, providing insights into the strategic alignment necessary for advancing technological capabilities while reducing misaligned expectations.

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SHAREShare to FacebookShare to TwitterShare to LinkedInShare to EmailPrint This PostWith ImagesWithout ImagesAUKUSPillar2has a PR problem—and no, not just among sceptical regional partners.Compared with evidentprogresson Australia’s future submarine capabilities under Pillar 1, analysts haveoften decrieda lack ofdetailorengagementaround Pillar 2, which is aimed at wider defence-technologycooperation.Despiteeffortstospotlighttrilateral innovation activities in the past 12 months, the absence of clear metrics for success, let alone a shiny new trilaterally developed capability carrying an AUKUSsticker, have led some to contend that Pillar 2 is falling short.Thishascontributed toskewed assumptions about what constitutessuccess forPillar 2.On closer inspection,Pillar2isactuallymakingsubstantialprogress,bothinnecessarilypreparing the field forfuturecooperationbyharmonising regulatory and policy settingsandbymaximisingoperational efficiency and interchangeability of advanced capabilities already in service.The problem is thatthese activities have, until now, not been cast askey outputs oressential waypoints in theservice ofoperationalisingPillar 2 projects.Perceptions that Pillar 2 is falling shortunderstandablyfrustratethosewithin the Australian strategic policy communityseizedby asense of urgency. Compared with the long lead times for Pillar 1,officialsandanalystsalikehaveframedPillar 2 as a means to accelerate the delivery of advanced capabilities to the militaryover a much shorter period,particularly within the next five years.But for many, this iscontradictedbyan apparent lack of‘new’material output in nearly two-and-a-half-yearsandagrowingto–dolist.Many members of the policy communityhavealso bemoaneda lack ofofficial information about Pillar 2’s innovation functionality objectivesorthe barriersto setting the enabling environment.The perceptionthatPillar 2 would delivertrilaterally developedadvanced capabilitieson an accelerated timelinehasled to inflated expectations about whatitshould,andcould,achievein the short term.On one level, this may be attributed tothelack of information or insight from the AUKUS governments about what has been happening in the Pillar 2 space.Yet,since as far back as2007,policy communities in all three countrieshave understoodmany of thechallengesandbarriersto defence industrial baseintegrationand technology co-development.In that context,theessentialinstitutional reforms and regulatory harmonisation effortsthat are now in trainin Australia,Britainand the USshouldbe considered legitimate outputs of Pillar 2, particularlyin its infancy.If AUKUSrepresents arevolutionindefence industrial and technology collaboration amongst allies, thenPillar 2 is as much about setting the conditions for more streamlinedcooperationon advanced capabilities as it is about the specific capabilities themselves.Properlysequencingthese activitiesis essentialin order toavoidrevisitingknownproblems every time a new trilateral innovation projectis launched.This is howthe three governments appear to be conceptualisingofPillar 2:as a scalpel for dissecting institutional barriers to trilateralco-innovation.Hugh Jeffrey,Australia’s deputy secretary of defence for strategy, policy and industry,intimated as much during a recentCSIS eventon Australia–US defence industrial cooperation.That this logic has now been stated publicly helps to recast reformeffortsasa core mandate ofPillar 2, rather than simply a hinderanceto its successor evidence of its stagnation.In that respect,it’s possible to imagine aninnovation lifecyclemodelforAUKUS Pillar2with threephases:reformingprocessesandsharing best practices,coordinatinginnovation andtechnologyadoption, and near-seamless co-innovation.The first phase is aboutharmonisingexport controls, progressingconversationsabout foreign disclosure, procurement policies, information-sharingand certification systems, but alsolimited innovation activities centred on data-sharing,capability demonstration, and building interoperability. This has includedactivitiessuch as aligning common artificial-intelligence algorithms on P-8A maritime patrol aircraft to improve data processingfortrilateral anti-submarine warfareactivities.The second phasefocusses oncoordinated innovation,whereby governments simultaneously conduct innovation challenges on an agreed themebut within theirnational contexts. An exampleis the AUKUS electronic warfareinnovation challenge, announcedin March 2024.Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy suggests that this phasemay also includethetrilateraladoptionanddeliveryof novel technologiesdevelopedby any one of the partners.Oncethese conditions are set,Pillar2couldprogress toathird phaseandideal end-state—genuine trilateralco-innovationand co-imagination.Thisthree-step model helps tosituatethe activities andprogresspublicly disclosed to dateinabroader context.It is also one thatresonateswithexperts well-versed in AUKUS Pillar 2 policy discussions inall three countrieswithwhomwe have recently engaged.Given the long-standing barriers to technology cooperation between even the closest of allies, it’s unsurprising that initial Pillar 2 outputs have focused on reforms to the enabling environment andonmaximising the operational efficiency and interoperability ofpriority capabilities.While co-innovation and co-production might be the gold-standardfor AUKUS Pillar 2, progress in that areais not arealistic metricto measure successin the short-term.To solvePillar 2’s two-pronged PR problem—limitedinformation and over-hyped expectations—the three partnersshouldfurtherclarifythe logic and importance of thisscalpelstrategyand thesequencing of the innovation lifecycle.This willhelpto not onlykeep industry and innovation stakeholders engaged and supportive, butalsobalance expectations about what is possiblewithinwhat timeframe.AlthoughPillar 2’s end goalismore ambitious than what we have seen to date,it was always going to be a challenging first step tosetthe enabling environmentfor future successandtomaximisepossibilitiesfor co-innovationwithincurrentlimitations.Going forward, clearly communicating Pillar 2’s necessary sequencingto the right audienceson an appropriate timeline is critical, as is an appreciation by other AUKUS stakeholders of the complexities of the bigger picture.