Light@ASPI_CTSASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investmentThe Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore thewebsiteand thebroader project here.Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact:[email protected]Executive SummaryThis report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, theTech Tracker’sdataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.China’s new gains have occurred inquantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication(semiconductor chip making). The US leads inquantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturinganddistributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such asradar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in theCritical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in theCritical Tech Trackerenable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term orad hocinvestments.8Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?ASPI’sCritical Technology Trackeris a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, theCritical Technology Trackerdoesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.TheTech Tracker’sdataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13Other parts of this project include:the Tech Tracker website:ASPI’sCritical Technology Tracker14contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.the 2023 report:We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’sCritical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16visual snapshots:Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.Key findingsGlobal and country findingsChina’s lead continues to grow:China has strengthened its global research lead in the past year and is currently leading in 57 of 64 critical technologies. This is an increase from 52 technologies last year, and a leap from the 2003–2007 period, when it was leading in just three technologies. Over the past 21 years, China’s rise from a mid-tier position in global research in the late 2000s to mid-2010s into a research and science powerhouse today has been gradual but consistent. It’s been able to convert its research lead into manufacturing17in some fields such aselectric batteries,18though there are other areas in which China has been slower to convert its strong research performance into actual technology capability (see page 16).China significantly strengthened its standing in the middle of the last decade:It was ahead of the US in 28 technology fields (out of the 64) in the years from 2013 to 2017. In other areas, it has only recently nudged ahead in the 2020s, including inhigh-performance computing, adversarial AI, advanced integrated circuit designandfabrication(semiconductor chip making),autonomous systems operation technologyandquantum sensors, reflecting Beijing’s push into AI and computing. It has also reached parity in its annual publication rate innatural language processing.The US is losing the strong historical advantage that it has built:Over the 21-year period, the US has been unable to hold its research advantage. In the early to mid-2000s, the US was by far the dominant research power. Its performance between 2003 and 2007 saw it leading in research for 60 out of 64 technologies. Over two decades, however, that research lead has slipped to only seven technologies (in the 2019–2023 ranking). Some notable holdouts includequantum computingandvaccine and medical countermeasures, in which the US still maintains a dominant position.19The knowledge, expertise and institutional strengths built over decades of investment and pioneering research are likely to continue to benefit the US in the short term, but China is catching up rapidly through an unsurpassed investment in its own S&T areas and top-performing institutions, especially in key defence and energy technology areas.China has built up potential monopoly positions in scientific expertise and top performing institutions:20In the fields in which China overtook the US a decade or more ago, it has tended to build steady and unassailable leads. In advanced materials and manufacturing, for instance, China made big gains from the late 2000s to mid-2010s, such that it now poses a monopoly risk with extremely high concentrations of research expertise and top-performing institutions in fields includingadvanced composite materials, advanced protection, coatings, smart materials, novel metamaterials, andnanoscale materials and manufacturing. In several key communication fields, notablyadvanced optical and radiofrequency communication, andundersea wireless communication, China took the lead in the mid-2010s and has built up substantial leads with between three and five times the research output of the US in the past five years, again posing monopoly threats. In comparison, China’s gains have been relatively recent in biotechnology, gene technology and vaccines, enabling it to surpass the US in its annual high-impact publication rate in the second half of the 2010s and into the 2020s in five of the seven biotechnologies covered in theTech Tracker(see Appendix 1 for a visual summary of all 64 technologies). The biotechnology field in which China poses the most significant monopoly risk issynthetic biology, where it’s publishing nearly five times more high-impact research than the US after taking the lead in 2016. However, the US still leads innuclear medicine and radiotherapyand maintains a substantial lead invaccines and medical countermeasures.India accelerates:India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year). This represents enormous gains from 2003–2007, in which India only placed in the top 5 countries for four technologies.21While India does not yet lead in any of the 64 critical technologies (note that currently only China and the US lead in any technology), it’s a strong performer across a range of technologies, especially inbiofuelsandhigh-specification machining processes,making major gains since 2019.Despite India’s upwards trajectory, few Indian institutions appear in the top 5 rankings across any period between 2003–2023. By recent performance, only five Indian institutions place within the top 5 across the 64 technologies.22Given that India currently does well at the national level (top 5 in 45 technologies), this finding suggests that the country’s research and scientific expertise in critical technologies is highly fragmented. That lack of standout institutional performers may be limiting India’s ability to attract foreign research talent and motivate prominent Indian scientists and technologists to stay at, or come back to, Indian institutions. This stands in contrast to a much smaller country such as Singapore, which manages to break into the top 5 country ranking in only two technologies,supercapacitorsandnovel metamaterials, but is then equally well represented in the top 5 institution rankings by the Nanyang Technological University (top 5 for 3 technologies) and the National University of Singapore (top 5 for 2).India seems poised to overtake China in its publication rate inbiofuelswithin the next few years. This is significant and would mark the only technology in which the lead country isn’t the US or China.The UK drops:The UK ranks in the top 5 countries for 36 technologies—a decline from 44 technologies in last year’s results. Looking at the 2003 to 2007 snapshot of results, the UK ranked in the top 5 countries for 47 technologies. The technologies in which the UK has fallen out of the top 5 rankings are spread across a range of areas, but are mostly technologies related to advanced materials, sensing and space. For example, the 2003 to 2007 snapshot shows the UK placing 2nd insatellite positioning and navigationandsmall satellitesand 3rd inspace launch systems. However, recent performance shows the UK placed 6th, 8th and 9th in these technologies, respectively. There have been some gains as well, particularly in defence related technologies such aselectronic warfareanddirected energy technologies.The European Union, as a whole, is a competitive technological player:With members of the EU aggregated over the past five years, we found that the EU leads in two technologies (gravitational-force sensorsandsmall satellites) and is ranked second in 30 technologies. When counted as a bloc, the EU’s position as the first- or second-ranked ‘country’ can change thetechnology monopoly riskin those technologies because of its impact on the ratio of the lead country’s research share over that of the second-ranked country as well as the number of institutions.As a bloc, the EU’s stronger alignment on building and supporting S&T capability can be seen through programs like Horizon Europe, the EU’s key program that funds research and innovation (worth €93.5 billion in 2021–27),23and fellowships which encourage and support the mobility of talent such as the European Commission’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellowships.24Many of the top performing European institutions in theTech Trackerhave long benefited (some substantially)25from these generous funding schemes. Groupings like AUKUS and the Quad (US, Japan, India, and Australia) could learn a lot from such schemes as they increase investment in select critical technology areas.Germany is the top-performing European Union country:Germany ranks in the top 5 countries in 27 technologies in recent results, with Italy in the top 5 in 15 technologies, and France lagging behind, ranking in the top 5 in only three technologies.Looking historically at 2003–2007, Germany was also the top-performing country in Europe, placing in the top 5 in 45 technologies compared with France (32) and Italy (10).South Korea’s performance shows that Japan has work to do:South Korea is in the top 5 for an impressive 24 technologies, mostly in the AI and energy and environment categories, while Japan is reduced to only eight, with strengths inwide and ultrawide bandgap semiconductorsandnuclear energy. Looking back to 2003–2007 shows that the two countries, which have similar histories of high-technology industrial strength, have more-or-less inverted in their positions over the two decades, with Japan then ranked in the top 5 countries in 32 technologies compared with South Korea’s seven.Iran excels at defence-sensitive technologies:Based on its performance over the past five years, Iran is in the top 5 countries in eight of the 64 technologies and is strong in advanced materials and manufacturing and biotechnologies. Iran ranks 3rd insmart materialsandair independent propulsion. Back in 2003–2007, Iran’s best performance was ranking 17th in machine learning.26In air-independent propulsion,27Iran has three of the top 10 institutions: the University of Tehran (5th), Islamic Azad University (7th) and Shahrood University of Technology (9th). In fact, Iran is the only country other than China to have institutions in the top 10 institutions inair-independent propulsion, smart materialsandadvanced data analytics. Islamic Azad University is the top Iranian institution and makes the top 10 institutions in six other technologies when ranked by recent performance:mesh and infrastructure-independent networks(1st),drones, swarming and collaborative robots(8th),smart materials(7th),advanced data analytics(7th),antibiotics and antivirals(6th) andbiofuels(8th).Australia has improved in some technologies and slipped in others:Based on recent performance, Australia is in the top 5 countries in seven technologies—a small drop from last year, when it ranked in the top 5 in nine technologies (the losses were inadditive manufacturingandadvanced protection).When comparing Australia’s recent results with those of 2003–2007, Australia has improved its overall ranking by moving up to rank in the top 10 countries in AI and robotic technologies (machine learning, natural language processing, advanced robotics and autonomous systems operation technologies), advanced materials and manufacturing (critical minerals extraction and processing and nanoscale materials and manufacturing), energy and environment (hydrogen and ammonia for power and supercapacitors) and biotechnologies (synthetic biology and genetic engineering).But Australia has slipped significantly in allquantum technologiesexcept forquantum sensors, biological manufacturingand in some key defence technologies (autonomous underwater vehicles, satellite positioning and navigationandhypersonic detection and tracking).AUKUS—the trilateral security and technology partnership involving the US, the UK and Australia28—closes the gap in some Pillar 2–relevant technologies, but not all:In a few technologies, such asadversarial AI, the combined research efforts of the AUKUS countries place the grouping on par with China (as the lead country). But, in a range of technologies, such asadvanced roboticsandautonomous systems operation technology, combined AUKUS efforts still trail China’s high-impact research output (see Figure 1 below).Combining AUKUS efforts with those of closer partners Japan and South Korea in these areas however helps close the gap in research performance. In some technologies, such asautonomous underwater vehiclesandhypersonic detecting and tracking, China’s high-impact research lead is so pronounced that no combination of other countries can currently match it.However, for all countries, it’s important to note that research underpinning the development of defence-related technologies can be considered sensitive and is among the most likely to shift into classified and commercial-in-confidence labs and projects. As the US has peaked earlier than China in those research areas, for example, it’s possible that, in some sensitive technology areas, there has been a movement of some research into classified or commercial-in-confidence spaces that has occurred after some of those peaks (for more discussion on this see pages 15-18). Notwithstanding that caveat, countries should avoid complacency, given that China, and all countries, are likely to do the same.Figure 1: Research share across a range of AUKUS Pillar 2–relevant technologiesData source: ASPI Critical Technology TrackerTechnology monopoly risk metric resultsScientific breakthroughs and research innovations in key defence technologies are increasingly likely to occur in China:Our technology monopoly risk metric—which show where there have been high concentrations of scientific expertise and high-impact research output in a single country within the past five years—reveals that various technologies with clear military and national-security applications have now changed from medium to high.29The new critical technologies now classified as ‘high-risk’ includeradar, satellite positioning and navigation, advanced aircraft engines, anddrones, swarming and collaborative robots. They joinhypersonic detection and trackingandelectronic warfare.China’s research lead in advanced materials and manufacturing technologies grows:China has steadily increased its research dominance in advanced materials and manufacturing—a category in which it already had a substantial lead.30Three additional technologies (high-specification machining processes, novel metamaterialsandsmart materials) have now increased from medium to high risk (see Appendix 1).Advanced protectionhas increased from low to high risk, while two other technologies (advanced magnets and superconductorsandcontinuous-flow chemical synthesis) have increased from low to medium risk.Institutional findings: US tech companies, government agencies and CASPrivate-sector research is increasingly concentrated in US technology giants:Looking at high-impact research conducted between 2019 and 2023, we see research excellence consolidating within a few US technology giants. IBM now ranks 1st inquantum computing, Google ranks 1st innatural language processingand 4th inquantum computing, and Meta and Microsoft also place 7th and 8th innatural language processingrespectively. The only non-US based companies that rank in the top 20 institutions for any technology are the UK division of Toshiba, which places 13th inquantum communications, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC), which place 20th inadvanced integrated circuit design and fabrication.Private sector research was more diverse between 2003-2007:When we look back at results from the 2003–2007 snapshot, there were a range of companies from around the world that ranked in the top 20 institutions. To name a few, IBM (US) ranked 1st inhigh-performance computing, Philips (Netherlands) ranked 3rd inadvanced integrated circuit design and fabrication, Samsung (South Korea) ranked 5th inadvanced radiofrequency communications, Microsoft (US) tied for 6th innatural language processing, Nokia31(US) and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT, Japan) ranked 4th and 7th respectively inadvanced optical communications, Reaction Engines Limited (UK) ranked 3rd inspace launch systems, and Merck (US) ranked 8th innovel antibiotics and antivirals research. Also placing in the top 20 rankings in different critical technology areas were Texas Instruments, Siemens and General Electric.The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is the global science and research powerhouse:CAS, which is thought to be the world’s largest research institute, is the top-performing institution in theCritical Technology Tracker. With approximately 113 institutes, its sheer size propels it into a dominant position.32For research conducted in the past five years, CAS leads, against all other institutions, in 31 of 64 technologies—a major increase from 2003–2007, when CAS was leading in only six technologies. CAS currently excels in energy and environment technologies, advanced materials (includingcritical minerals extraction and processing) and in a range of quantum, defence and AI technologies, includingadvanced data analytics, machine learning, quantum sensors, advanced roboticsandsmall satellites(see page 19 for more on CAS).Government agencies and national laboratories feature prominently:A range of government-affiliated research organisations appear throughout the 2019–2023 rankings. In particular, NASA ranks 1st in space launch systems and 3rd insmall satellites, and the US’s National Institute of Standards and Technology ranks 2nd inatomic clocks. After CAS (discussed above), the government-affiliated organisation that ranks strongly across the most technologies is the Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres, which ranks 2nd inspace launch systems, 3rd insatellite positioning and navigation, 4th inadvanced magnets and superconductorsand 5th ingravitational sensors.33However, the presence of government agencies and labs has dropped over the 21-year period. There were many more in the 2003–2007 data, and they were leading in more technologies. For example, in 2003–2007 the French National Centre for Scientific Research led inadvanced magnets and superconductors,small satellitesandsupercapacitors, India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research led inbiological manufacturing, and the US’s Agricultural Research Service led inbiofuels. The direct involvement of government-affiliated research organisations is especially evident in technologies with strong defence applications such asadvanced explosives and energetic materials, where each of the top 3 institutions were government-affiliated: the Los Alamos National Laboratory (US), the Defence Research and Development Organisation (India) and the Russian Academy of Sciences. Our results show that a similar concentration of government-linked research institutes was leading in advancedaircraft enginesin 2003–2007.Chinese companies play a relatively small role in the global research ecosystem:Despite their very strong performance in a wide range of technologies at the national level, Chinese companies still lag in their rankings for high-impact research. For example, inadvanced aircraft engines, a technology for which China published around 70% of total global high-impact research in 2023, the top-performing company is the Aero Engine Corporation of China (founded in 2016), which on recent performance ranks 22nd. Similarly, inadvanced radiofrequency communication, in which China was responsible for 30% of global high-impact research in 2023, Huawei Technologies, as the top-performing Chinese company, ranks only 58th by recent performance and is completely absent when ranked by performance between 2003 and 2007. While for all countries it’s research-dedicated institutions that lead most of the rankings in theTech Tracker, it’s surprising that Chinese companies aren’t higher up and closer to their US counterparts, many of which rank highly.Full ReportFor the full report, pleasedownload here.28 Aug 2024ASPIs two-decade Critical Technology TrackerTue, 08/27/2024 - 17:51nathanhaslam@a…AttachmentDownload7.04 MBProgram link/program/international-cyber-policy-centreReferences1Critical Technology TrackerCritical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra.2aspi.org.auJamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023.321-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details.4In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies.5nature.comBec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024.6politico.comElsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020.7economist.comSee, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 .8embopress.orgEva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11.9nla.gov.auThese technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, The
Strategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ .10doi.orgFelix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9.11Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power.12See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2.13Critical Technology Tracker‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker.14Critical Technology TrackerCritical Technology Tracker.15See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.16Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44.17wsj.comNoting that China’s investment in manufacturing and the support it provides factories is reportedly far larger than any other country, see Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong, ‘The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League’, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024.18iea.org‘Lithium-ion battery manufacturing capacity, 2022–2030’, International Energy Agency, 22 May 2023.19cnas.orgFor quantum computing, see Sam Howell, The quest for qubits: assessing US–China competition in quantum computing, Center for a New American Security, May 2024.For vaccines, see Alexandra Stevenson, ‘These vaccines have been embraced by the world. Why not in China?’, New York Times, 18 February 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/business/china-coronavirus-vaccines.html .20See Appendix 1 for full details of how we have calculated the technology monopoly risk metric and for relevant results.21Please note that some of the technologies we track were just beginning to emerge during the period 2003–2007. We avoid ranking technologies for which the dataset is too small for rankings past the leading country to be statistically significant. For example, in this period, India also ranked 4th in additive manufacturing, with a high-impact research credit of 2 papers.22These are Sathyabama Institute of Science and Technology in biofuels, Nirma University in distributed ledgers, the Vellore Institute of Technology and Anna University (Chennai) in mesh and infrastructure independent networks¸ and the Homi Bhabha National Institute in nuclear waste management and recycling. In this update of the Critical Technology Tracker, the Indian Institute of Technology and the National Institute of Technology (which were strong Indian performers in our previous report) were disaggregated into their individual institutes to conform to their separate listing in the Nature index (see full methodology in Appendix 2).23europa.euFor more on Horizon Europe see Horizon Europe, European Commission.24europa.euFor more see Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, European Commission.25The Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres and National Research Council (Italy) for example, are two of the EU’s most prominent research institutions covered by the Critical Technology Tracker. In our 21-year dataset, these institutions have collectively published over 25,000 research papers supported by these programs.26This is based on technologies where the number of high-impact publications of Iran is statistically significant for the ranking.27Note that we focused our search terms on compact energy generation and potential relevance for AUKUS Pillar 2’s ‘undersea capabilities’.28defense.govDepartment of Defense, ‘AUKUS: The trilateral security partnership between Australia, UK and US’, US Government, no date.‘Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)’, Australian Government, no date, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf .29Our lead indicator for risk associated with high concentrations of S&T expertise in a single country.30Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.31Nokia (US) is the AT&T Bell Labs as Nokia acquired Bell Labs in 2016. All publications under AT.T. Bell Labs and Lucent Technologies listed under the US affiliations are aggregated as Nokia (US).32cas.cn‘CAS institutes’, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 2024.Note that we counted the universities under CAS management as separate institutions.33See Appendix 4 for a more comprehensive (though still necessarily selective) list of government research entities that we see in our data.AuthorDr Jennifer Wong LeungData ScientistFull bioStephan RobinData ScientistFull bioDanielle CaveDirector - Executive, Strategy & ResearchFull bioAcknowledgementsThank you very much to internal and external reviewers, whose comments and contestability on previous drafts improved this work. They include internals Alexandra Caples, David Wroe, Justin Bassi, Mike Bareja, Jocelinn Kang, Bethany Allen and externals including Jamie Gaida, David Lin, Clement Fredembach and anonymous reviewers. Thank you also to Dannielle Pilgrim, Byron Illyes, Daria Impiombato, Steve Clark, Tilla Hoja, for contributions they have made to the project across 2023–24. We would also like to thank the Patent Analytics Hub, IP Australia for providing us with the patent datasets included in this report, and for their advice on those datasets.Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of technologies, can get in touch via:[email protected].About ASPIThe Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online atwww.aspi.org.auand in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.ASPI Cyber, Technology & SecurityThe Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online atwww.aspi.org.auand in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.ASPI Cyber, Technology and SecurityASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security (CTS) analysts aim to inform and influence policy debates in the Indo-Pacific through original, rigorous and data-driven research. CTS remains a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, foreign interference and issues related to information operations and disinformation. CTS has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building and Internet safety, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, CTS has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public, private and civil society sectors. Current projects are focusing on capacity building in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region, across a wide range of topics. CTS enriches regional debate by collaborating with civil society groups from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia through our international fellowship program. We thank all of those who support and contribute to CTS with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the CTS, contact:[email protected].FundingThank you to the Australian Government which provided partial funding for this update to theCritical Technology Tracker. Thank you also to previous funders—the US State Department and Special Competitive Studies Project—who provided support in 2022-2023 which enabled theCritical Technology Trackerto be built.Important disclaimerThis publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services.© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2024This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.First published August 2024Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy InstituteCyber, Technology & Security