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What Sets Human Consciousness Apart From AI? – Podcast

The Guardian

SKIPPED

Details

Date Published
24 Mar 2026
Priority Score
2
Australian
No
Created
24 Mar 2026, 02:00 pm

Authors (3)

Description

Ian Sample speaks to author and journalist Michael Pollan about his new book A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness

Summary

This discussion explores the boundary between biological consciousness and artificial intelligence, examining whether physical processes and subjective experiences are replicable in digital systems. Author Michael Pollan argues for the necessity of defending the human mind against technology-driven saturation, highlighting the ethical and philosophical risks of misattributing consciousness to AI. While the conversation touches on the distinctiveness of human cognition, it serves primarily as a philosophical inquiry rather than a technical analysis of frontier AI safety or catastrophic risk mitigation.

Body

What sets human consciousness apart from AI? – podcast00:00:0000:00:00Why is it like something to be ourselves and how do physical processes create our subjective experience? These questions get to the heart of the knotty problem of consciousness, and they provided the spark for the latest book from award-winning author and journalist Michael Pollan. In A World Appears, Pollan goes in search of answers about what we do and don’t know about consciousness, and why it has proven such an elusive phenomenon. He tells Ian Sample how thoughts and feelings shape our conscious experience, whether we can learn anything about human consciousness from AI, and why he thinks our minds need to be defended in today’s technology saturated worldOrder A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness by Michael Pollan via the Guardian BookshopHas a 25-year-old bet taken us a step closer to understanding consciousness?Support the Guardian: theguardian.com/sciencepod Photograph: Ink Drop/AlamyExplore more on these topicsScienceScience WeeklyConsciousnessNeuroscienceHuman biologyPsychology